




































Institute of Social and Economic Research 
University of Alaska 
3211 Providence Drive 




This page intentionally left blank 
 
 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................1 
1.1. Purpose of Study..........................................................................................................................1 
1.2. Description of the Southeast Alaska Area ...................................................................................2 
1.3. Air Operations in Southeast Alaska.............................................................................................3 
1.4. Review of Recent Studies ............................................................................................................3 
2. Aviation Accidents and Incidents in Southeast Alaska ........................................................................7 
2.1. Summary......................................................................................................................................7 
2.2. Accidents in Alaska and Southeast ..............................................................................................7 
2.3. Accident Rates .............................................................................................................................9 
2.4. Accidents Potentially Preventable by Capstone Equipment ......................................................10 
3. Commercial Operations......................................................................................................................13 
3.1. Terminal Operations ..................................................................................................................13 
3.2. Air Carriers and Commercial Operators ....................................................................................14 
3.3. Employees..................................................................................................................................16 
3.4. Aircraft as of June 2001.............................................................................................................17 
3.5. Avionics in Southeast Operator Aircraft as of June 2001..........................................................19 
4. Southeast Alaska Aviation Facilities ..................................................................................................21 
4.1. Airport Facilities ........................................................................................................................21 
4.2. Runway Characteristics .............................................................................................................23 
4.3. Instrument Approaches ..............................................................................................................25 
4.4. FAA Facilities............................................................................................................................25 
4.5. Communications Facilities.........................................................................................................25 
4.6. Weather Reporting Facilities .....................................................................................................27 
4.7. Navigation Facilities in Southeast .............................................................................................28 
5. Safety programs..................................................................................................................................31 
5.1. FAA Requirements ....................................................................................................................31 
5.2. Southeast Operator Safety Programs .........................................................................................31 
6. FAA Surveillance ...............................................................................................................................31 
7. Weather...............................................................................................................................................33 
7.1. Common Weather Hazards in Southeast Alaska .......................................................................33 
7.2. Weather Variability....................................................................................................................33 
7.3. Weather Data Summary.............................................................................................................34 
8. Baseline Surveys.................................................................................................................................43 
8.1. Purpose.......................................................................................................................................43 
8.2. Results........................................................................................................................................43 
Appendix A.  Southeast Accidents, 1990-2001 ....................................................................................... A-1 
Appendix B.  Southeast Alaska Airports and Community Population......................................................B-1 








FAA Capstone Program Baseline Report April 2003 
Phase II Southeast Alaska 
 
  1 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose of Study 
This report provides the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with information on air safety 
and aviation infrastructure in southeast Alaska as of December 31, 2002.  The data will establish a 
baseline to enable the University of Alaska Anchorage (UAA) to conduct an independent evaluation of 
how the Capstone program affects aviation safety in the region. The FAA contracted with UAA’s Institute 
of Social and Economic Research and Aviation Technology Division to do a variety of training and 
evaluation tasks related to the Capstone program. The program is a joint effort of industry and the FAA to 
improve aviation safety and efficiency in select regions of Alaska, through government-furnished 
avionics equipment and improvements in ground infrastructure.  
The first phase of the program began in southwest Alaska in 1999. Phase II, in southeast Alaska, 
began in March 2003. The name “Capstone” is derived from the way the program draws together 
concepts and recommendations in reports from the RTCA (formerly Radio Telecommunications 
Conference of America), the National Transportation Safety Board, the Mitre Corporation’s Center for 
Advanced Aviation System Development, and representatives of the Alaskan aviation industry. 
The Capstone program in southeast Alaska will install global positioning system (GPS)/wide area 
augmentation system (WAAS) avionics and data link communications suites in certain commercial 
aircraft; deploy a ground infrastructure for weather observation, surveillance, and Flight Information 
Services (FIS); and increase the number of airports served by instrument approaches.  It will also create a 
usable instrument flight rules (IFR) infrastructure by reducing the minimum enroute altitudes on most 
airways and adding special low altitude routes and approaches. The FAA expects these improvements 
will reduce the number of mid-air collisions, controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) incidents, and weather-
related accidents in southeast Alaska. 
The program focuses on air carriers conducting passenger and cargo operations under parts 133 
and 135 of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR; 14 CFR, Chapter 1). Part 135 operators typically fly air 
taxi, commuter, and flightseeing operations; part 133 operators use helicopters for various non-passenger 
activities such as helicopter logging. Aircraft owned by these carriers will be eligible to receive Capstone 
avionics in southeast Alaska. A large share of FAR part 135 operations in southeast Alaska are by float 
planes flying under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in the summer season.  
To form a complete picture of aviation safety in southeast Alaska, this study includes information 
on the aviation safety record not only of Capstone-eligible aircraft, but also general aviation aircraft, 
military planes, and private carriers regulated under other FAR parts. We present data on safety incidents 
dating back 10 or more years, but we emphasize the safety record from 1997 through 2002. Two 
challenges confront our safety analysis.  
First, a significant regulatory change during this period confounds attempts to interpret aviation 
statistics. Second, data on air traffic in Alaska are limited and problematic. We briefly explain each of 
these issues. In early 1997, the FAA dramatically increased the scope of commercial aviation regulated 
under the more restrictive FAR part 121. Since March 20, 1997, all scheduled service using turbojet 
aircraft or aircraft with 10 or more passenger seats has fallen under part 121. The effect of this regulatory 
change on flight operations is not known. However, it is likely that many companies providing passenger 
service adjusted their fleets to avoid the cost of recertification under part 121. In addition, some service 
conducted under part 135 prior to 1997 is probably now under part 121, as the FAA presumably intended. 
This change makes it difficult to compare earlier data on incidents or operations to more recent data. 
Second, the available data on flight operations is not highly accurate. The only source of publicly 
available data on air traffic that can provide regional and local information is the FAA’s Terminal Area 
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Forecast (TAF)1 system. That system uses data from airport operations to project future aviation system 
demands. The terminal operations data is of questionable reliability for airports without control towers to 
monitor traffic. In southeast, that includes all communities except Juneau. Consequently, accident and 
incident rates based on these data should be used with caution. 
1.2. Description of the Capstone Southeast Alaska Region 
The Capstone Southeast Alaska region (Capstone SE Alaska region) as defined in this study is all 
the area of Alaska south of north latitude 61 degrees and east of west longitude 146 degrees. This area 
includes Alaska’s panhandle and extends westward from the north end of the panhandle along the Gulf of 
Alaska to Cordova, on the western edge of Prince William Sound.  The area is remote, with only a few 
roads between villages and no road connection to the state’s metropolitan centers.  Residents rely on 
water travel in the summer and air travel year round. The 45 communities in the area have more than 
75,000 residents, with almost half living in the regional hub of Juneau, which is also the state capital.  Of 
the 44 other communities, 29 have fewer than 500 residents. The map below shows the major 
communities; Appendix B lists them all. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Terminal Area Forecast System (http://www.apo.data.faa.gov/faatafall.HTM), created by the FAA’s Office of 
Aviation Policy and Plans, is the official forecast of aviation activity at FAA facilities.  The forecasts are prepared to 
meet the budget and planning needs of the constituent units of the FAA and to provide information that can be used 
by state and local authorities, the aviation industry, and the public.  
FAA Capstone Program Baseline Report April 2003 
Phase II Southeast Alaska 
 
  3 
1.3. Air Operations in the Capstone Southeast Alaska Region 
The Capstone SE Southeast Alaska region has 84 airport facilities—24 airports, 8 heliports, and 
52 seaplane bases.  Table 1-1 shows the 2002 traffic estimates (including commercial, private, and 
military) from the FAA’s Office of Aviation Policy and Plans. Commercial air traffic operations (take-
offs and landings) in the region totaled about 240,000 in 2002—nearly 20 percent of commercial air 
traffic operations statewide. 
Table 1-1 also shows total general aviation traffic operations totaling 163,580, or about 12 
percent of general aviation operations 
statewide.  Keep in mind that the 
airport terminal observations do not 
include landings and take-offs at 
locations away from established 
airports and therefore underestimate 
total aviation traffic in the region—
especially itinerant general aviation 
originating in urban areas such as 
Anchorage and Juneau. Again, these 
numbers and any safety incident rates 
estimated from them should be 
interpreted with care. 
 
 
1.4. Review of Recent Studies 
Seven recent studies are of particular interest and relevance to the Capstone project: 
•  Berman, M. et al. (2001).  Air Safety in Southwest Alaska: Capstone Baseline Safety Report.  
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage.   
•  Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage (2002).  Capstone 
Phase I Interim Safety Study 2000/2001.  Prepared in cooperation with the Aviation Technology 
Division, Community and Technical College, University of Alaska Anchorage and the MITRE 
Corporation. 
•  Kirkman, Worth W. (2002).  The Safety Impact of Capstone Phase 1, an Interim Assessment of 
2000-2001. MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, McLean, Virginia. 
•  National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (1995).  Aviation Safety in Alaska 
•  FAA (1999).  Joint Interagency/Industry Study of Alaskan Passenger and Freight Pilots. 
•  Garrett, L. C., G. A. Conway, J. C. Manwaring (1998). “Epidemiology of Work-Related Aviation 
Fatalities in Alaska, 1990-94” in Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine Vol. 69, No. 12. 
•  Mitchell, M. T., American Airlines Training Corporation. (1982). Final Report on Definition of 
Alaskan Aviation Training Requirements. 
Geographic Area.  All seven studies of these cover a portion of Alaska or the state as a whole.  
They are relevant because the problems they describe are problems in southeast Alaska as well.  Their 
characterization of commuter and air taxi operations in Alaska is also applicable to southeast Alaska. 
Data Sources.  The FAA, NTSB and Garrett studies used the NTSB/FAA accident and incident 
database.  The FAA and NTSB studies also fielded surveys. The FAA surveyed pilots in 1998, and the 
NTSB surveyed pilots and operators in 1995. The NTSB study also included interviews with Alaska 
aviation personnel; information from public forums; and a 1994 survey of commercial pilots and 
Table 1-1. Total Terminal Operations Activity 2002* 
  SE Alaska Region Alaska 
FAR Part 121 Air Carriers 28,872 185,277 
Air Taxis and Commuters 210,657 1,018,959 
General Aviation-Local 70,425 552,546 
General Aviation-Itinerant 93,155 769,869 
Military 3,718 76,044 
Total Operations 406,827 2,602,515 
* Preliminary 2002 data     
Source: FAA Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Terminal Area Forecast System 
(http://www.apo.data.faa.gov/faatafall.htm) 
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operators conducted by the Ames Research Center of NASA.  The Mitchell study is also survey-based.  
The study team interviewed air taxi operators and pilots.  The Garrett study combined the NTSB database 
with statewide data on occupational deaths.   
Brief Summary. The NTSB (1995) report examined commuter airline, air taxi, and general 
aviation accidents.  The study focused on accidents during take-off and landing and accidents related to 
flying under visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).  It identified VFR 
into IMC as the leading safety problem for commuter airlines and air taxis in Alaska.  It also cited seven 
safety issues: (1) pressures on pilots and commercial operators to provide services in a difficult 
environment with inadequate infrastructure; (2) inadequate weather reporting; (3) inadequate airport 
inspections and airport condition reporting; (4) current regulations for pilot duty, flight, and rest time; (5) 
inadequacy of the current instrument flight rules system; (6) enhancements to the IFR system needed to 
reduce reliance on VFR and; (7) the needs of special aviation operations.  
The FAA (1999) study has a narrower focus than the NTSB report.  It examined controlled-flight- 
into-terrain (CFIT) accidents where VFR into IMC is listed as a causal factor.  The aim of the FAA study 
was to identify differences between companies that had CFIT accidents and those that hadn’t. It found 
several statistically significant differences.  Pilots who had not had CFIT accidents had more flying 
experience; perceived their company's safety program as better than those of companies that had CFIT 
accidents; and relied less on station agents for pre-flight weather decisions.  
Garrett et al. (1998) also examined CFIT accidents as part of a larger study comparing fatality 
rates in aviation and other occupations.  The authors analyzed differences among pilots based on levels of 
training and experience and found that commercial and transport pilots were significantly more likely to 
have IMC conditions at the crash site than were pilots holding private pilot's licenses.   
Mitchell (1982) focused on air taxi operations and interviewed 177 air taxi pilots.  The study was 
the basis for designing a training program suited to the conditions pilots in Alaska face.   It identified 
decision-making skills and operational procedures that are necessary for operations in Alaska’s weather 
and environmental conditions.  Based on the interviews, the study team found that lack of weather 
information and communication facilities; management policies; and insufficient decision-making skills 
combined with rapidly changing weather and difficult terrain to make flying in Alaska hazardous. A  
large share of pilots interviewed cited overloading; incomplete weather information; pressure to fly in 
marginal conditions; lack of training in mountain flying and off-airport take-offs and landings; pilots with 
alcohol problems; and violations of the 8-hour rule as being safety problems.  Pilots also noted that profit 
motives drove many management decisions to fly in unsafe conditions. 
Berman et al (2001) provided the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with information on air 
safety and aviation infrastructure in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Capstone program area as of January 1999, 
just before Phase I of the program began.  The data established a baseline to enable the University of 
Alaska Anchorage to conduct an independent study assessing the safety effects of Capstone.  The report 
focused on air carriers conducting passenger and cargo operations under parts 121 and 135, respectively, 
of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR; 14 CFR, Chapter 1), since aircraft owned by these companies 
serving the Bethel area were scheduled to receive Capstone avionics. However, general aviation aircraft 
also operate in the area, as do a limited number of military planes and private carriers not regulated under 
parts 121 and 135. Therefore the baseline report took into account the safety record of aviation overall in 
the study area.  The report included safety incidents occurring in the previous 10 years, with emphasis on 
the safety record from 1995 through 1999. 
The ISER Capstone Phase I Interim Safety Study 2000/2001 evaluated aviation safety changes in 
the Yukon-Kuskokwim Capstone area through the end of 2001.  ISER first analyzed data for the period 
1990-1999, before the Capstone program started. Researchers quantified the scarcity of navigation aids 
and weather information for pilots flying in the Yukon-Kuskokwim (Y-K) Delta. They then looked at 
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accidents and found that if the new technology had been installed on all aircraft in the test region during 
the 1990s, it might have prevented about 1 in 7 of all accidents and nearly 1 in 2 fatal accidents, by 
mitigating all causes of the accidents; and helped pilots avoid more than half of all accidents and 
fatalities, by mitigating some but not all of the causes of the accidents.   
Preliminary recommendations included continuing the Capstone program; marketing the program 
to operators and pilots; insuring adequate pilot training; expanding ground-based transceiver coverage; 
providing radar-like approach control services; and requiring more operator feedback. 
Kirkman (2002) provided an interim assessment of Capstone in the Y-K Delta region, comparing 
accident rates in the delta before and after implementation of Capstone and reporting on implementation 
in the region.  The author compared accidents by type and by Capstone equipped and non-equipped 
aircraft.  Kirkman concluded that “the Capstone program made significant progress toward implementing 
safety and efficiency capabilities for commercial aviation for the Y-K Delta.”  He noted that important 
steps like pilot training and surveillance infrastructure were not yet fully implemented in the region. 
Relevance to the Capstone Project and its Evaluation.  All seven of these studies are relevant 
for the Capstone evaluation.  The FAA, NTSB and Garrett, et. al. are relevant because they provide 
detailed information about CFIT accidents.  All three studies recommend using global positioning 
systems (GPS) to reduce accidents caused by flying under VFR into IMC; improving weather reporting 
services at VFR-only airports; and using GPS technology to expand the IFR route structure.  The Mitchell 
study provides a detailed discussion of accident causes and factors that Capstone avionics don’t address.  
It helps us to understand cases where these avionics have little or no effect on safety.  The MITRE report 
and baseline and interim reports from ISER provide illustrative and key evaluation of the existing status 
of aviation conditions in Alaska and the implementation of Capstone in the Yukon-Kuskokwim area. 
Recommendations Relevant to the Safety Study Design.  From the FAA study, we plan to use 
both the survey data and the research findings and recommendations.  We will use the survey data to see 
if there are differences between pilots flying in southeast Alaska and in the rest of the state, and to 
identify factors in accidents that Capstone doesn’t address and that we need to control for.  These factors 
include risk-taking behaviors; company operations; training; and safety policies and procedures. In our 
study design we are using findings and recommendations from the NTSB, Garret, and Mitchell studies.  
The Mitchell study also confirmed that pilots are somewhat reluctant to be interviewed, fearing punitive 
action.  Our experience in southwest Alaska confirms this finding, although some pilots and operators 
have become more open and candid as the study progresses.  Also, southwest Alaska pilots tended to 
initially be more optimistic about both benefits and potential problems of the Capstone program than they 
are after experience with the program; we expect to see this same pattern in southeast Alaska.  
FAA Capstone Program Baseline Report April 2003 
Phase II Southeast Alaska 
 
  6 
 
This page intentionally left blank 
 
 
FAA Capstone Program Baseline Report April 2003 
Phase II Southeast Alaska 
 
  7 
2. Aviation Accidents and Incidents in the Capstone Southeast Alaska Region 
2.1. Summary 
Section 2 reviews accidents statewide and in the Capstone SE Alaska region from 1990 through 
2002.  It discusses total accidents and fatal accidents by type of carrier; estimates accident rates for the 
state and region; and identifies accidents that Capstone avionics could potentially have prevented, had 
they been in place.  
Between 1990 and 2002, accidents and incidents in the Capstone SE Alaska region made up 
about 11 percent of the statewide total (241 of 2,151).  Within that region, FAR part 135 operators 
accounted for 42 percent of accidents (97 of 233).  Most accidents involving part 135 operators were on 
non-scheduled flights (54 of 97).  Accident rates from 1990 through 2002 were lower in the region than in 
state as a whole, but fatality rates were higher. 
The Capstone program could potentially have prevented 22 percent of accidents in the Capstone 
SE Alaska region from 1990 through 2002, had the program been in place.  The potential effects of the 
Capstone program are strongest for fatal accidents.  More than half of all fatal accidents in the region 
during this period were potentially preventable by Capstone avionics, training, and data. 
2.2. Accidents in Alaska and the Capstone Southeast Alaska Region 
Data covering accidents and incidents come from NTSB Aviation Accident and Incident 
database.  We got access to the data using the NTSB Website http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp.  
Accident and incident data in this report cover the period from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 
2002.  We used latitude and longitude information to create a subset of data covering southeast Alaska.  
We categorized accidents by Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) part number,2 scheduled and non-
scheduled service for the Capstone SE Alaska region and the entire state. 
Table 2-1 summarizes data for the state and region for 1990 through 2002.  It breaks out the total 
accidents and incidents, accidents, fatal accidents and fatalities by type of operation for the Capstone SE 
Alaska region and Alaska as a whole.  
The NTSB data include all the accidents but only a subset of the incidents—generally those that 
were downgraded from accidents—that are reported to the FAA.  Of the 60 incidents statewide in this 
period, eight were in the Capstone SE Alaska region. The table shows that from 1990 through 2002: 
•  233 accidents occurred in the Capstone SE Alaska region, with 54 resulting in fatalities.  The 
share of accidents with fatalities (23 percent) was more than twice as high in the region than in 
the state as a whole (11 percent).   
•  Air taxis accounted for 24 percent of accidents and 41 percent of fatalities in the region.  
•  Commuters accounted for 4 percent of accidents in the region (10 out of 233), 2 percent of fatal 
accidents (1 out of 54) and 3 percent of fatalities (4 out of 126).   
•  Part 135 operators flying as Part 91 accounted for 14 percent of accidents (33 out of 233), 13 
percent of fatal accidents (7 out of 54), and 11 percent of fatalities (14 out of 126).   
                                                 
2 We used information on type of flight, owner and operators to identify part 135 operators flying as part 91. 
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  Southeast Alaska Southeast Alaska Southeast Alaska Southeast Alaska 
Air Carriers Operating Under FAR Part Number 121         
 Non Scheduled 2 15 2 12 0 1 0 4 
 Scheduled 4 26 2 12 0 0 0 0 
Air Carriers Operating Under FAR Part Number 135           
 Non Scheduled 57 355 54 343 17 51 52 136 
 Scheduled 10 110 10 99 1 17 4 59 
 135 Operating as Part 91 33 250 33 242 7 23 14 43 
Air Carriers Operating Under FAR Part 91            
  FAR Part 91 117 1290 115 1280 24 127 45 234 
 FAR Part 91 - Public 5 71 5 70 0 4 0 6 
Other              
 FAR Part 125 0 5 0 5 0 1 0 2 
 FAR Part 129 0 8 0 7 0 1 0 2 
 FAR Part 133 13 20 12 20 5 6 11 12 
 FAR Part 137 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Total  241 2151 233 2091 54 232 126 498 
Source: NTSB (2003) Accident and Incident Database.  Data cover 1/1/90 through 12/31/2002. 
 
Figure 2-1 shows that the number of accidents in Alaska has been declining since 1990.  Three-
year moving averages have dropped from 183 in 1990-1992 to 135 from 2000-2002.  The trend in 
southeast Alaska is less clear, but appears to be declining as well, moving from an average of 22 per year 
from 1990-1992 to 14 per year from 2000-2002.  Total accidents in the Capstone SE Alaska region during 
this period ranged from 11 to 27 annually. 
 
Figure 2-1: Accidents in Alaska and Southeast, 1990-2002 
  
Source NTSB (1990-2002) Accident and Incident Databases 
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Figure 2-2 shows accidents in the Capstone SE Alaska region from 1990 through 2002 by FAR 
part number. Accidents involving part 135 operations are commuters, air taxis, and part 135 flying as 91. 
Of all accidents, air taxis and 135 flying as part 91 made up the largest share.  
Figure 2-2. Accidents in the Capstone SE Alaska Region 
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Source NTSB (2003) Accident and Incident Database 
2.3. Accident Rates 
To construct accident rates we need data for both the numerator—the number of accidents—and 
the denominator—the amount of flying, which is often measured in departures, hours flown, or 
enplanements.  We have excellent data on accidents, and all our rate calculations use the same accident 
data.  The accident and fatality counts for Alaska and the Capstone SE Alaska region come from the 
NTSB accident and incident database.  Accident and fatality counts for the U.S. come from FAA (1999) 
Accidents, Fatalities and Rates, Preliminary Statistics.  As discussed above, we will look at incident rates 
in more depth later in the study. Data on departures, hours flown, or enplanements in southeast Alaska are 
all limited. We carefully reviewed the available data sets with staff from FAA, BTS, NTSB, and NIOSH. 
•  U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) data include departures and flight hours.  
However, these data are available only at the company and state level and not for regions 
within the state.  Also, they show only the commuter departures and hours of part 135 air 
carriers and do not include unscheduled flights.  
•  The national General Aviation and Air Taxi Survey provides an estimate of total Alaska 
flight hours for unscheduled air taxi and general aviation operations, as well as scheduled 
commuter service. However, the data are reported at the state level, and it is not currently 
possible to extract numbers for southeast Alaska.   
•  The APO Terminal Forecast Survey Summary Report from the FAA’s Aviation Policy and 
Plans Office uses historical data on traffic counts from FAA Form 5010, the Airport Master 
Record.  This is the only systematic data available for the Capstone SE Alaska region.  For 
airports with control towers, airport managers report the number of aircraft cleared for takeoff 
or landing. For airports without towers, which include many southeast Alaska airports, airport 
managers estimate the annual traffic counts. We have made rough estimates of annual 
departures by dividing the traffic counts by two. This method assumes that each departure 
results in a traffic count at both the departing and the arriving airport. It undercounts 
unscheduled air taxi and general aviation departures, since it would not count departures from 
off-airport locations.   
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Table 2-2 shows accident and fatality rates for air taxis, commuters, and FAR part 135 flying as 
part 91 and for general aviation from 1998 through 2002.  The accident and fatality counts come from the 
NTSB database.  Departure data come from the APO Terminal Area Forecast. 
During that period, accident rates for part 135 operators in the Capstone SE Alaska region were lower 
than for the state—5.8 per 100,000 departures, compared with 9.9 statewide.  But fatality rates were 
slightly higher—3.7 per 100,000 departures in southeast and 3.2 statewide.  General aviation accident 
rates were also lower in the Capstone SE Alaska region—10.3 per 100,000 departures, compared with 
13.2 statewide. Fatality rates were higher—4.0 per 100,000 departures compared with 1.5 statewide. 
. 
Table 2-2.  Estimated Accident and Fatality Rates per 100,000 Departures: 
Air Taxis, Commuters and General Aviation 
for Alaska and Southeast Alaska, 1998-2002 








 Southeast Alaska Southeast Alaska Southeast Alaska 
Air Taxis, Commuters, and Part 135 as 91
a
 107,525 504,600  6.2 50.0 4.0 16.2 
General Aviation 
b,c
 79,951  694,830  8.2 91.8 3.2 10.6 
   Rate per 100,000 Departures 
   Accidents Fatalities 
   Southeast Alaska Southeast Alaska 
Air Taxis, Commuters, and Part 135 as 91
a
   5.8 9.9 3.7 3.2 
General Aviation 
b,c
   10.3 13.2 4.0 1.5 
Sources:       
1. NTSB (2003) Accident and Incident Database     
2. FAA (2003) APO Terminal Area Forecast Summary Report     
Notes:       
a. Departure data for Air Taxis and commuters do not count at private airports or off-airport sites.  We assume that FAR part 135 air carriers 
operating under part 91 are counted in air taxi and commuter departures. 
b. General Aviation is from APO Terminal Area Forecast reports.  We assume this is FAR part 91 
c. FAR public accidents and fatalities are counted in General Aviation 
2.4. Accidents Potentially Preventable by Capstone Equipment 
The Capstone program includes safety enhancements that may be able to prevent accidents from a 
wide variety of causes.  The avionics, training, and data provided by the Capstone system are more likely 
to help pilots avoid some types of accidents than others.  We looked at accident narratives and causal 
information in the NTSB dataset for each accident in the Capstone SE Alaska region and determined 
whether having Capstone avionics and training could have helped prevent the accident. 
Figure 2-3 divides 231 accidents in the region from 1990 through 2002 into ten basic cause 
categories. 3. The inner pie shows all accidents divided into the ten major categories. The extensions show 
more details of causes within the major categories. Remember that a large share of FAR part 135 
operations in southeast Alaska are by float planes flying under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in the summer. 
Capstone avionics, training and data can help pilots avoid CFIT accidents, collisions between 
aircraft, and some accidents where flight information is a factor.  From 1990 to 2002 in the Capstone SE 
Alaska region, about 23 percent—52 of the total 231 accidents—might have been prevented if the 
Capstone program had been in place. 
                                                 
3  Table 2.1 reports 233 accidents in Southeast from 1990 to 2002.  Two of the accidents do not have narratives in 
the database so these figures cover 231 accidents.  Appendix A contains text summaries and coding of accidents in 
Southeast.  
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Nine Basic Cause Categories 
1. Mechanical:  Engine failure, inoperable control surfaces, 
failed landing gear or floats, propeller or shaft failure.  
2. Navigation: Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) while en 
route is often associated with reduced visibility and small 
navigational errors.  Some CFIT accidents are due to pilots 
being off-course.  
3. Traffic:  Usually mid-air collisions.  Also includes ground or 
water accidents from last-moment avoidance of other aircraft 
and from jet blast on airport surface.  
4. Flight Information:  Usually accidents that result from 
inadequate weather information and are often caused by icing 
and sometimes poor visibility but rarely convective weather. 
(Surface winds contributing to take-off or landing accidents 
have been included under take-off or landing rather than here.)   
5. Fuel:  Accidents caused by running out of fuel. 
6. Flight Prep:  Accidents caused by a variety of poor flight 
preparation measures, including failure to insure that cargo is 
tied down and within the aircraft’s weight and balance limits 
and failure to check if fuel has been contaminated by water.   
7.Takeoff:  Accidents during take-off, including pilots’ failure to 
maintain control in wind, improper airspeed, waterway debris, 
hazards at remote lakes, rivers without markings or moorings, 
poor runway conditions and obstacles at off-runway sites.  
8. Landing: Accidents during landing, including pilots’ failure to 
maintain control in wind, improper airspeed, waterway debris, 
hazards at remote lakes, rivers without markings or moorings, 
poor runway conditions and obstacles at off-runway sites.  
9. Other: Includes colliding with watercraft or ground vehicles, 
hitting birds and pilots under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
10. Unknown:  Missing aircraft, cause not determined.  
Detailed Cause Categories 
Capstone Relevant Causes 
1. Weather: Accidents where the availability of weather 
information was a factor. 
2. CFIT: Controlled Flight into Terrain (or Water) accidents  
3. TCF: CFIT accidents that occur on approach or departure.  
4. Map: Accidents where the pilot did not know aircraft’s location 
5. Midair: Midair Collisions between aircraft. 
6. Runway: Collisions between aircraft on the ground or water. 
 
Other Causes 
7. Runway: Accidents on take-off or landing related to runway or 
waterway conditions such as potholes, submerged obstacles the 
runway 
8. Site: unusual hazards of water or off-runway sites 
9. Water taxi: collisions with objects (not a/c) while taxiing on the 
ocean, rivers or lakes.  













Source: NTSB (2003) Accident and Incident Database 
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Figure 2-4 shows the causes of the 54 fatal accidents in the Capstone SE Alaska region from 1990 
through 2002. Capstone could potentially have prevented a much larger share of fatal accidents than of 
total accidents. More than half of the 54 fatal accidents in the region had causes that Capstone avionics, 
training, and data address.  Most fatal accidents were CFIT accidents, either in cruise flight or on 
approach or departure.  Fatalities in float plane accidents are often pilot or passenger drowning. 
 


























Source: NTSB (2003) Accident and Incident Database 
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3. Commercial Operations  
Information in this section is from several FAA sources and U.S. Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics.4 The scope of operations—and in some cases the operators themselves—in the Capstone SE 
Alaska region change over time. Data on air operations within the region are limited. Departure and 
enplanement data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) record only scheduled 
passenger and cargo flights. The only systematic regional data available during the baseline period (1997-
2001, with preliminary data for 2002) come from the Terminal Forecast Survey Summary Report, 
produced by the FAA’s Aviation Policy and Plans Office (APO).  The APO compiles historical traffic 
counts from FAA Form 5010, the airport master record.   
In Juneau, the air traffic controllers report the number of aircraft cleared for take-off or landing. 
At all other airports in the region, airport managers provide estimates of annual traffic counts. We 
estimated annual departures by dividing the traffic counts by two. As a result, this method undercounts 
operations to and from off-airport locations. 
In addition, operations data from 1990 to 1996 had fluctuations that could not be attributed to any 
credible reason. It is difficult to ascertain why the earlier data had these fluctuations, except that many 
airports without towers did not begin reporting estimates until 1996. Because the data from 1990 to 1996 
is likely an inaccurate representation of operations, we have limited our analysis to operations data from 
1997 to 2001, with preliminary data for 2002. 
3.1. Terminal Operations 
Terminal operations information for the Capstone SE Alaska region is from the FAA Office of 
Aviation Policy and Plans Terminal Area Forecast System. There was little variation in the number of 
terminal operations reported in the region from 1997 to 2002.  Air taxis and commuters comprised more 
than half (54 percent) of the total regional operations during that period (Figure 3-1). 





















Air Taxis and Commuters
General Aviation - Itinerant
General Aviation - Local
FAR Part 121 Carriers
Military
 
Source: FAA Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Terminal Area Forecast System 
                                                 
4 The Vital Information System (VIS), June 2001; Capstone web site, http://www.alaska.faa.gov/capstone/status.htm 
Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Terminal Area Forecast System site, http://www.apo.data.faa.gov/faatafall.htm. 
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Figure 3-2 shows terminal operations for the entire state of Alaska from 1997 through 2002.  
Overall and within each category, the number of operations remained relatively constant.  Air taxis and 
commuters represented the largest share (38 percent) of operations statewide.  

































Source: FAA Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Terminal Area Forecast System 
 
 
3.2. Air Carriers and Commercial Operators 
Table 3-1 lists the 40 FAR part 135 operators flying in Capstone’s SE Alaska region as of 
January 2003. Several of these also operate under part 133.  These carriers account for most commercial 
flights in southeast Alaska.  Ten operators have their main office presence in Juneau, nine in Ketchikan, 
five in Cordova, three in Petersburg and Sitka, and ten in smaller communities. These companies employ 
about 242 pilots, with the largest share (41 percent) employed in Ketchikan, followed by Juneau with 
approximately 33 percent.  These operators fly to most airports in the region, as well as some places 
outside the area. 
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Table 3-1: Part 133 and 135 Air Carriers Supervised by  
the Juneau Regional FAA Office 
Air Operator Name Community 
Air Excursions LLC Gustavus 
Yakutat Coastal Airlines Yakutat 
Air Sitka Inc Sitka 
Alaska Coastal Airlines Inc Juneau 
Alaska Juneau Aeronautics Inc Juneau 
Alaska Seaplanes Service LLC Juneau 
Alaska Wilderness Outfitting Cordova 
Les Hartley Yakutat 
Carlin Air (Jeff Carlin) Ketchikan 
Coastal Helicopters Inc Juneau 
Cordova Air Service Cordova 
Misty Fjords Air and Outfitting (David P. Doyon) Ketchikan 
Earth Center Adventures Inc Haines 
Family Air Tours LLC Ketchikan 
Fishing & Flying Cordova 
Harris Aircraft Services Inc Sitka 
L.A.B. Flying Service Inc Juneau 
Tinqmasoon (Edwin Harley Laity) Sitka 
Alaska Fly ‘N Fish Charters (Harold J. Laughlin) Juneau 
Island Wings Air Service (Michelle Masden) Ketchikan 
Prince Of Wales Air Taxi (Ronald Nickolas Merfeld) Craig 
North Star Helicopters (North Star Trekking, LLC) Juneau 
Pacific Airways, Inc Ketchikan 
Pacific Wings Inc Petersburg 
Promech Inc Ketchikan 
Nordic Air (Douglas D. Reimer) Petersburg 
Fjord Flying Service (Charles David Schroth) Gustavus 
Scott Air Craig 
Silver Bay Logging Inc Juneau 
Silverado Air Taxi Cordova 
Skagway Air Service Inc Skagway 
Southeast Aviation Ketchikan 
Sunrise Aviation Wrangell 
Tal Air Juneau 
Temsco Helicopters Inc Ketchikan 
Taquan Air (Venture Travel LLC) Ketchikan 
Ward Air Inc Juneau 
Wilderness Helicopters Cordova 
Ronald Ward Juneau 
Kupreanof Flying Service (John N. Williams) Petersburg 
Source: Leonard Kirk, Capstone Program Manager, University of Alaska Anchorage, 2003  
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3.3. Employees 
The majority of the southeast Alaska operators are very small. Table 3-2 groups the 40 companies 
by the number of pilots they employ. Most (26) are small, employing between one and three pilots. The 
other 14 companies are about equally divided between those that employ between 4 and 10 pilots and 
those that employ 11 or more. 
 
Table 3-2.  Companies in Capstone SE Alaska Region 
by Number of Pilots and Location 
 Community  
# of Pilots Juneau Ketchikan Other Total 
1-3 3 5 18 26 
4-10 4 2 2 8 
11 or more 3 2 1 6 
Total 10 9 21 40 
Source: Leonard Kirk, Capstone Program Manager, University of Alaska Anchorage, 
2003 
 
Table 3-3 lists all employees, not just pilots, of the 40 operators in the Capstone SE Alaska 
region.  Keep in mind that some of the operators fly outside as well as within southeast Alaska. The table 
shows all employees, by job title, (taken from the VIS) of these companies, not just those employees 
involved in southeast Alaska operations. Over half of the companies have five or fewer employees and 
over a third are one-person operations.  The two largest firms, however, each employ more than 100 
persons, including not only pilots but also dispatchers, maintenance personnel, and others. 
Table 3-3. Selected Employee Totals by Type, Southeast 
Operators, June 2001 
Type of Employee Number 
Pilot In Command Captains 230 
Other Pilots 12 
Check Airmen 28 
Dispatchers 4 
Inspectors 26 
Designated Inspectors 25 
NonCertificated Mechanics 9 
Certificated Mechanics 108 
Total Number of Employees 635 
Source: FAA Vital Information System, 6/1/2001  
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3.4. Aircraft as of June 2001 
As of June 2001, companies supervised by the Juneau flight standards district office (FSDO) 
operated 231 aircraft under FAR part 135. Those are shown by type in Table 3-4. Among the aircraft 
operating under part 135 in 2001, all 51 helicopters and about 7 percent (12) of the 180 fixed wing aircraft 
had turbine engines. In addition to the aircraft shown in Table 3-4, there were 93 helicopters certified for 
operations under FAR part 133 (rotor wing external load) and part 137 (agricultural aircraft). Most of 
these support logging operations, and many of them are also certified to operate under part 135, and so are 
included in the 51 helicopters in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4. Number of Part-135 Certified Aircraft  
in the Capstone SE Alaska Region 
by Type , Make and Model, June 2001 
  Number of Aircraft by Type 
 











Engine Sea Helicopter 
Total 
Aircraft 
AS-350     31 31 
BE-18    1  1 
BE-36 1     1 
BHT 206     5 5 
BHT 212     2 2 
BN 2   2   2 
Cessna 172 1     1 
Cessna 180 2 3    5 
Cessna 185 11 13    24 
Cessna 206 25 7    32 
Cessna 207 3     3 
Cessna 208 4 3    7 
CHAMP 1     1 
DeHavilland Beaver 5 38    43 
DH 3 1 10    11 
DH 6    2  2 
ECD-EC-135     1 1 
FH-1100     1 1 
Helio 250 1     1 
HU-369     11 11 
Piper PA 12 1     1 
Piper PA 18 3 2    5 
Piper PA 28 8     8 
Piper PA 31   4   4 
Piper PA 32 26     26 
Piper PA 34   2   2 
Grand Total 93 76 8 3 51 231 
Source: FAA Vital Information System, 6/1/2001           
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Table 3-5 shows the passenger capacity of these 231 aircraft–689 passengers.  Four aircraft are 
cargo only; passenger aircraft capacities range from one to 19 passengers each.  
 
Table 3-5. Aggregate Passenger Capacity of Part-135 Certified Aircraft  
in the Capstone SE Alaska Region 
by Type , Make and Model, June 2001 
  Aircraft Type 
 









Engine Sea Helicopter 
Total 
Aircraft 
AS-350 51     51 
BE-18   7   7 
BE-36    5  5 
BHT 206 8     8 
BHT 212 14     14 
BN 2  9    9 
Cessna 172    3  3 
Cessna 180    6 12 18 
Cessna 185    47 48 95 
Cessna 206    89 49 138 
Cessna 207    5  5 
Cessna 208    27 27 54 
CHAMP    1  1 
DeHavilland Beaver    28 76 104 
DH 3    10 39 49 
DH 6   19   19 
ECD-EC-135 6     6 
FH-1100 3     3 
Helio 250    5  5 
HU-369 4     4 
Piper PA 12    2  2 
Piper PA 18    3 3 6 
Piper PA 28    12  12 
Piper PA 31  27    27 
Piper PA 32    34  34 
Piper PA 34  10    10 
Total 86 46 26 277 254 689 
Source: FAA Vital Information System, 6/1/2001          
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Most of these part 135 aircraft are VFR-only–199 of 233–and over 40 percent of the fixed-wing 
fleet is certified for VFR daytime operations only.  The 34 IFR-certified aircraft represent only 
four companies. 
Table 3-6. Capstone SE Alaska Region Part 135 Aircraft  
by Type of Operations 
Count Fixed Wing Helicopter Total 
VFR DAY 80 0 80 
VFR (Day & Night) 72 47 119 
IFR 30 4 34 
Total 182 51 233 
Percent Fixed Wing Helicopter Total 
VFR DAY 44% 0% 34% 
VFR (Day & Night) 40% 92% 51% 
IFR 16% 8% 15% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: FAA Vital Information System, 6/1/2001   
 
3.5. Avionics  
The information on avionics in aircraft used by Capstone SE Alaska region operators in 2001 is 
taken from the VIS (June 1, 2001), photos of cockpit configurations, owner-operator interviews and data 
from the FAA’s FSDO employees who oversee the operation certificates. 
The avionics in these aircraft vary widely, from the minimum required for night VFR to full IFR 
panels with redundant systems. For example, one aircraft certified for day and night VFR operations is 
equipped with a single Nav/Com 360 channel radio with VOR receiver. Another twin-turbine aircraft has 
a much more sophisticated avionics suite and is certified for IFR operations as well as operations in 
known and forecast icing.  Its avionics include dual 720 channel communications radio, dual VOR 
receivers with ILS and LOC capability, dual DME receivers, dual ADF receivers, dual GPS navigators, 
transponder, radar altimeter, and weather radar. 
The aircraft listed in this baseline study as VFR aircraft generally have radio packages using 
navigation equipment that is not certified for IFR operations. In most cases the equipment is the original 
delivered with the aircraft and is therefore at least 20 years old. Operators also install radios that do not 
meet any FAR requirements and are only for company convenience. These are typically CB radios or 
marine radios used to talk to station agents in the villages. 
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4. Capstone Southeast Alaska Region Aviation Facilities 
4.1. Airport Facilities 
There are 84 landing facilities in the Capstone SE Alaska region (Table 4-1): 24 airports, 52 
seaplane bases, and 8 heliports.  Appendix B gives a full list.  Most of the facilities–71, or 85 percent—
are available for public use.  The State of Alaska owns about half (41 of 84) of the facilities.  Table 4-2 
below shows that five publicly owned heliports and two publicly owned airports are not available for 
public use; ten privately owned seaplane bases are available for public use. 
 
Type of Facility Private Public Total
Airport 3 21 24
Heliport 8 8
Seaplane 2 50 52
Total 13 71 84
Table 4-1. Landing Facilities, Capstone SE Alaska Region by 
Ownership and Type
Public or Private Use?




Table 4-2. Landing Facility Use by Ownership,  
Capstone SE Alaska Region 
 Privately Owned Publicly  Owned Total 
Airports 
Private Use 1 2 3 
Public Use 0 21 21 
Total 1 23 24 
Heliport 
Private Use 3 5 8 
Public Use 0 0 0 
Total 3 5 8 
Seaplane Base 
Private Use 2 0 2 
Public Use 10 40 50 
Total 12 40 52 
Source:  FAA Forms 5010, compiled by GCR, Associates as the FAA 5010 
database, http://www.gcr1.com 
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Most of these facilities have single runways with minimal navigation, weather monitoring, or 
other services.  Only Juneau International Airport has a control tower.  The majority of these facilities (64 
of the 84) are unattended, and about half of those attended are during daylight hours only. Only 14 
facilities have lighting–13 of the 24 airports, no heliports and one seaplane base (Table 4-3). Fuel is 
available at 21 facilities–ten airports, ten seaplane bases and one heliport–and repairs at 16 facilities 
(Table 4-4). 
Table 4-3. Lighting, Capstone SE Alaska Region Landing Facilities 
Lighting Airport Heliport Seaplane Base Total 
24 Hour 0 0 0 0 
Dusk-Dawn 7  1 8 
Radio Controlled/Request 6   6 
None 11 8 51 70 




Table 4-4. Services Available, Capstone SE Alaska Region Landing Facilities 
  Fuel 
  Yes No 
Fuel Available? 21 63 






Airframe Repairs 8 8 68 
Powerplant Repairs 8 8 68 
Source:  FAA Forms 5010, compiled by GCR, Associates as the FAA 5010 database, http://www.gcr1.com 
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4.2. Runway Characteristics  
Airports in the Capstone SE Alaska region have 32 runways (28 land runways and 4 water 
runways), and seaplane bases have 55 water runways and one wooden helicopter pad.  Half of the airport 
runways are paved, one-quarter are gravel, and the remainder are turf or water (Table 4-5).   
 
Table 4-5. Runways in Capstone SE Alaska Region Landing Facilities  
by Runway Material and Facility Type 
  Facility Type   
Surface Type Airport Heliport Seaplane Base  Total 
Asphalt 15 1 0 16 
Concrete 1 1 0 2 
Gravel 8 1 0 9 
Turf 4 0 0 4 
Water 4 0 55 59 
Wood 0 5 1 6 
Total 32 8 56 96 
Source:  FAA Forms 5010, compiled by GCR, Associates as the FAA 5010 database, http://www.gcr1.com 
 
Airport runway lengths range from 1,100 feet (East Alsek River) to 8,456 feet (Juneau International); 
more than half are less than 150 feet wide (Tables 4-6 and 4-7). Water runway lengths range from 1,000 
feet (Excursion Inlet) to 10,600 feet (Bell Island Hot Springs); nearly a third are less than 1,000 feet wide 







1,000' - 1,999' 8 29%
2,000' - 2,999' 2 7%
3,000' - 3,999' 3 11%
4,000' - 4,999' 2 7%
5,000' - 5,999' 3 11%
6,000' - 6,999' 5 18%
7,000' - 7,999' 4 14%
8,000' - 8,999' 1 4%
Total 28 100%
Table 4-6. Length of Land Runways, 
Capstone SE Alaska Region Airports
Source:  FAA Forms 5010, compiled by GCR, Associates as the FAA 
5010 database, http://www.gcr1.com  
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Table 4-7. Width of Land Runways, Capstone SE Alaska Region Airports 
Width Number of Runways Percent of Runways 
<25' 3 11% 
25' - 49' 3 11% 
50' - 74' 4 14% 
75' - 99' 3 11% 
100' - 124' 4 14% 
125' - 149' 0 0% 
150' - 174' 11 39% 
Total 28 100% 
Source:  FAA Forms 5010, compiled by GCR, Associates as the FAA 5010 database, http://www.gcr1.com 
 
Table 4-8. Length of Water Runways, Capstone SE Alaska Region 
Landing Facilities 
Length Number of Runways Percent of Runways 
1,000' - 1,999' 1 2% 
2,000' - 2,999' 2 3% 
3,000' - 3,999' 4 7% 
4,000' - 4,999' 6 10% 
5,000' - 5,999' 10 17% 
6,000' - 6,999' 3 5% 
7,000' - 7,999' 2 3% 
8,000' - 8,999' 1 2% 
9,000' - 9,999' 5 8% 
10,000' - 10,999' 25 42% 
Total 59 100% 
Source:  FAA Forms 5010, compiled by GCR, Associates as the FAA 5010 database, http://www.gcr1.com 
 
Table 4-9. Width of Water Runways, Capstone SE Alaska Region  
Landing Facilities 
Width Number Percent of Runways 
150' - 499' 10 17% 
500' - 999' 8 14% 
1,000' - 1,999' 18 31% 
2,000' - 2,999' 14 24% 
3,000' - 3,999' 2 3% 
4,000' - 4,999' 3 5% 
5,000' - 6,999' 3 5% 
>7,000' 1 2% 
Total 59 100% 
Source:  FAA Forms 5010, compiled by GCR, Associates as the FAA 5010 database, http://www.gcr1.com 
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4.3. Instrument Approaches 
Ten of the Capstone SE Alaska region airports had some form of instrument approach in 2002 
(Table 4-10). Stand-alone GPS approaches are proposed for the Juneau, Haines, and Hoonah airports.   




Circling) ILS/DME VOR/DME LOC/DME NDB/DME LDA/DME ILS GPS VOR NDB MLS LOC LDA 
Cordova 27 YES            
Gustavus 29  YES     YES        
  Circling         YES     
Juneau 8                 YES     YES 
Kake 10    YES   YES       
Ketchikan 11 YES                       
  Circling       YES     YES           
Klawock 2    YES   YES       
Petersburg Circling         YES   YES           
Sitka 11     YES  YES       
  Circling    YES   YES YES YES     
Wrangell Circling         YES   YES           
Yakutat 2  YES     YES       
  11  YES    YES YES  YES     
  29   YES YES       YES YES         
Source:  Index of Terminal Charts and Minimums and Dennis Stoner, FAA Anchorage Flight Procedures Office 271-5220    
 
4.4. FAA Facilities 
The FAA operates a tower in Juneau and flight service stations (FSS) in Juneau, Ketchikan, and 
Sitka.  The Juneau tower operates from 0600 to 2300 hours (local) from May through September, and 
0700 through 2100 hours (local) from October through April.  The Juneau and Ketchikan flight service 
stations operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; the Sitka FSS is open from 0600 to 2145 (local), 7 days a 
week.  These facilities provide services to pilots, including weather briefings and traffic control (Juneau 
tower) or traffic management (the flight service stations). 
4.5. Communications Facilities 
Communications for pilots flying in the Capstone SE Alaska region are provided by FAA 
facilities (FSS and towers) and by remote communications outlets (RCOs), remote tower relays (RTRs), 
and remote communications air to ground facilities (RCAGs)  (Table 4-11).  The FAA’s Pilot/Controller 
Glossary describes these facilities as follows: 
Remote Communications Outlet (RCO): An unmanned communications facility remotely 
controlled by air traffic personnel. RCOs serve FSSs.  
Remote Transmitter /Receivers (RTRs): serve terminal ATC facilities. An RCO or RTR may be 
UHF or VHF and will extend the communication range of the air traffic facility. There are several 
classes of RCOs and RTRs. The class is determined by the number of transmitters or receivers. 
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Classes A through G are used primarily for air/ground purposes. RCO and RTR class O facilities 
are nonprotected outlets subject to undetected and prolonged outages. These facilities were 
established for the express purpose of providing ground-to-ground communications between air 
traffic control specialists and pilots located at a satellite airport for delivering en route clearances, 
issuing departure authorizations, and acknowledging instrument flight rules cancellations or 
departure/landing times. As a secondary function, they may be used for advisory purposes 
whenever the aircraft is below the coverage of the primary air/ground frequency. 
Remote Communications Air/Ground Facility (RCAG): An unmanned VHF/UHF 
transmitter/receiver facility used to expand ARTCC air/ground communications coverage and to 
facilitate direct contact between pilots and controllers. RCAG facilities are sometimes not 
equipped with emergency frequencies 121.5 MHz and 243.0 MHz. 
Table 4-11. Communication Facilities in the Capstone SE Alaska Region 
Remote Communication Air Ground (RCAG) Locations 
Annette Lena Point 
Biorka Island Level Island 
Gustavus Yakutat 
Remote Communications Outlet (RCO) Locations 
Angoon Kake 
Annette Ketchikan 
Biorka Island Klawock 
Cape Spencer Lena Point 
Cape Yakataga Level Island 
Duncan Canal Mt Eyak 
Gustavus Petersburg 
Haines Ratz Mountain 
High Mountain Robert Barron 
Hoonah Skagway 
Johnstone Point Sitka 
Juneau Wrangell 
 Yakutat 
Remote Transmitter/Receiver (RTR) Locations 
Juneau Lena Point 
Source:  FAA Alaska Region, Airway Facilities Office 
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4.6. Weather Reporting Facilities 
Weather data are limited both by the number of reporting stations and by the quality of data they 
report.  The quality of data from any of these sources depends on the type of reporting station.  In the 
Capstone SE Alaska region, there are a number of different station types but most airports have no 
reporting stations.  Weather-reporting stations in the region include: 
•  Automated sites: 
Automated Surface Observation System (ASOS)  
Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS).   
Both types of automated sites report visibility but do not report what phenomena might 
be obscuring it.  For example, one half-mile visibility could result from snow or fog or 
some other weather condition that we would be unable to determine. 
•  A-Paid stations are remote, non-aviation weather facilities reporting to the NWS for 
forecasting. These stations gather supplemental weather data at remote locations like 
lodges to assist the NWS in developing forecast models.  A-Paid sites may be of interest 
to aviators if they are in mountain passes and report visibility.  They may be limited by 
time, either time of day or seasonality.  
•  FAA Contract Weather Observation Station (FCWOS), a station paid by the FAA to 
provide weather observations; may be limited by time, either time of day or seasonality.  . 
•  Limited Aviation Weather Reporting Stations (LAWRS), these provide ceiling and 
visibility information and may be limited by time, either time of day or seasonality.  
•  Weather Service Office (WSO), manned; provides area forecasts and terminal forecasts.  
Table 4-12 lists the number of each type of weather reporting stations; because some locations 
have multiple types of weather station, the 24 stations are in only 18 locations.  Table 4-13 lists the 
weather facilities by location. 
 
Table 4-12. Weather Facilities by Type, 
Capstone SE Alaska Region 







Total Unduplicated Locations  18 
Note: Weather facilities are counted in each reporting type category that is applicable; the 
same facility may be listed in more than one type category 
Source: NWS at http://www.alaska.net/~nwsar/station-identifiers.html, July 5, 2001 
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Almost all the current weather observations for pilots in the region are from 16 automated 
weather stations.  As table 4-13 shows, there is some level of staffing at 7 of the 18 locations (the four A-
paid, two FCWOS, the LAWRS and the WSO), but 24-hour automated observations at those locations 
provide most of the weather information pilots receive. 
Table 4-13. Weather Facilities by Location,  








Annette PANT ASOS NWS 
Elfin Cove PAEL Apaid NWS 
Cordova PACV ASOS FAA 
Gustavus PAGS AWOS/Apaid  FAA 
Haines PAHN ASOS NWS 
Hoonah PAOH AWOS/Apaid FAA 
Hydaburg PAHY AWOS FAA 
Juneau PAJN ASOS/FCWOS/LAWRS FAA 
Kake PAFE AWOS FAA 
Ketchikan PAKT ASOS FAA 
Klawock PAKW ASOS NWS 
Metlakatla PAMM AWOS FAA 
Petersburg PAPG AWOS FAA 
Port Alexander PAAP Apaid NWS 
Sitka PASI ASOS FAA 
Skagway PAGY ASOS NWS 
Wrangell PAWG AWOS/FCWOS FAA 
Yakutat PAYA ASOS/WSO  NWS 
Source: NWS at http://www.alaska.net/~nwsar/station-identifiers.html, July 5, 2001 
 
In addition to weather reporting stations, pilots can now access “Weather Cams” over the internet.  
These cameras provide pilots with internet access a real-time look in several directions from the camera 
location, and in some cases a loop showing hourly weather images over the preceding several hours.  
Cameras may be off-line, or pilots may not have adequate internet access to use them.  However, pilots 
and operators have generally been very positive about weather cameras, and they add significantly to the 
current weather data available to pilots before they take off.  There are nine weather camera locations in 
the Capstone SE Alaska region (Table 4-14). 
Table 4-14. Weather Cameras by Location,  
Capstone SE Alaska Region 
Location Camera Directions   
Cape Yakataga East Northwest   
Gustavus East West   
Haines West North Southeast  
Johnstone Point West North East South 
Lena Point Southeast West North  
Level Island Southeast Northeast Northwest  
Pederson Hill  North East South West 
Sisters East Southeast West  
Sitka Northwest South   
Source:  FAA, http://akweathercams.faa.gov/wxcams/map.php 
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4.7. Navigation Facilities in the Capstone Southeast Alaska Region 
Table 4-15 summarizes navigation facilities available to aviators in the Capstone SE Alaska 
region. 
Table 4-15. Navigation Facilities in the Capstone SE Alaska Region 
Name Ident Kind Range Lat Long 
Clam Cove CMJ NDB Terminal 55N 131W 
Coghlan Island CGL NDB Low Level 58N 134W 
Elephant EEF NDB Low Level 58N 135W 
Fredericks Point FPN NDB Low Level 56N 132W 
Glacier River GCR NDB  60N 144W 
Gustavus GAV NDB High and Low Level 58N 135W 
Haines HNS NDB Low Level 59N 135W 
Mendenhall MND NDB Low Level 58N 134W 
Mount Edgecumbe IME NDB Low Level 57N 135W 
Nichols ICK NDB High and Low Level 55N 131W 
Ocean Cape OCC NDB High and Low Level 59N 139W 
Sitka SIT NDB High and Low Level 56N 135W 
Sumner Strait SQM NDB Low Level 56N 133W 
Yakataga CYT NDB  60N 141W 
Kake AFE NDB-DME Low Level 56N 133W 
Klawock AKW NDB-DME Terminal 55N 133W 
Level Island LVD VOR-DME High and Low Level 56N 133W 
Annette Island ANN VORTAC High and Low Level 55N 131W 
Biorka Island BKA VORTAC High and Low Level 56N 135W 
Johnstone Point JOH VORTAC High and Low Level 60N 146W 
Sisters Island SSR VORTAC High and Low Level 58N 135W 
Yakutat YAK VORTAC High and Low Level 59N 139W 
Source: Falling Rain Genomics at http://www.fallingrain.com/air/cache/geo/USAK/nav.html 5 July 01 
 
FAA Capstone Program Baseline Report April 2003 
Phase II Southeast Alaska 
 
  30 
 
This page intentionally left blank 
 
FAA Capstone Program Baseline Report April 2003 
Phase II Southeast Alaska 
 
  31 
5. Safety programs 
5.1.  FAA Requirements  
Air carrier safety programs vary from extensive systems of procedures and training requirements 
to one-page statements of safety goals. Requirements for safety programs vary according to which federal 
aviation regulations (FARs) govern the flights a carrier operates. In general, carriers that operate under 
part 135 have wide latitude about how they structure and operate their safety programs.  There are no 
requirements under part 135 for a director of safety or a formal safety program.  
After the initiation of Capstone Phase I in southwest Alaska and prior to the initiation of Phase II 
in southeast Alaska, the Alaska Air Carriers Association began a safety initiative now funded as the 
Medallion Foundation. This program is designed to help air carriers improve their safety records by 
operating at a higher standard than is required. At the time of this report, five of the FAR 135 operators 
eligible to participate in Capstone in southeast Alaska are participants in the Medallion program and are 
building significant safety programs.  The Medallion Program description is available at 
http://www.medallionfoundation.com.  
5.2. Operator Safety Programs 
All the air carrier certificates held by the Juneau Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) are 
either FAR 133 or 135 (Table 3-1). The FAA does not require directors of safety for air carriers operating 
under these regulations. Although they are not required to have directors of safety, the five southeast 
Alaska operators that are Medallion participants do have directors of safety and defined safety programs.  
None of the non-Medallion operators have defined safety programs. Discussions with operators made it 
clear they are unlikely to establish such programs unless required to do so under FAR 133 or 135. 
None of the potential Capstone operators in southeast Alaska are required to use certificated 
aircraft dispatchers. Although some operators do use dispatchers, they are all defined in the operations 
manuals as flight followers or schedulers.  Flight followers and schedulers are not directly responsible for 
any safety decisions.  They provide flight following as part of their duties, which include aircraft and 
crew scheduling duties.  Safety decisions, including Go/NoGo decisions, are the responsibility of the 
pilots, chief pilots, and directors of operations for these operators.  
6. FAA Surveillance  
The Federal Aviation Administration’s Alaskan Region has one Flight Standards District Office 
in Juneau (designated FSDO-5) supervising air carriers in southeast Alaska and westward along the Gulf 
of Alaska as far as Cordova.  The FSDO has air carrier safety inspectors for each operator in its area. 
Different inspectors cover operations, airworthiness, and avionics; they may be assigned only one air 
carrier or a number of air carriers, depending on the size and complexity of those carriers.  
There is not a single focal point of aviation activity in the Capstone SE Alaska region.  Operators 
fly from numerous bases, including Ketchikan, Juneau, Sitka, Cordova, Yakutat, Wrangell, Petersburg 
and Anchorage.  The inspectors from Juneau and Anchorage travel widely in the region to provide 
operator surveillance.   
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7. Weather 
7.1. Common Weather Hazards in the Capstone SE Alaska Region 
Aviation weather hazards in the Capstone SE Alaska region include several conditions that create 
poor visibility and low ceilings. The FAA’s Advisory Circular 00-6A on aviation weather defines the 
common weather hazards.  Historical weather reports allow us to estimate how frequently these hazards 
occur and how often the weather conditions approach operational limits as defined in FARs.  However, as 
we will discuss below, historical and current weather data are often not adequate for precise 
measurements of “how often” and “how much of the time.”  
Fog is a surface-based cloud of water droplets or ice crystals. It is the most frequent cause of 
surface visibility below 3 miles, and is one of the most common and persistent weather hazards in 
aviation (AC 00-6A pg. 126).  Two types of fog occur frequently in southeast Alaska and along the Gulf 
Coast. Advection fog forms when moist air moves over colder ground or water. It is most common along 
coastal areas (AC 00-6A pg. 127). Ice fog occurs in cold weather when the temperature is below freezing 
(AC 00-6A pg. 128).  Sunshine during the day can warm the fog and lift fog layers off the surface or 
evaporate them; however, fog tends to persist during the short hours of daylight during the winter. 
Low stratus clouds may reduce ceilings below minimum safe levels.  In many cases there is no 
line of distinction between such clouds and fog; one gradually merges into the other. Visibility may 
approach zero (AC 00-6A pg. 128).  High winds over snow-covered terrain create blowing snow that can 
reduce visibility to near zero at ground level, even under clear weather conditions (AC 00-6A pg. 130).   
Finally, precipitation—rain, snow, drizzle, freezing drizzle, and freezing rain—commonly 
presents ceiling and visibility problems. 
7.2. Weather Variability 
Capstone’s Southeast Alaska region stretches from Cordova to the south tip of Prince of Wales 
Island, the most southern portion of Alaska.  The area is a marine environment with extremely variable 
weather and frequent storm systems with low ceilings and fog.  Many destinations in the area do not have 
weather reporting facilities.  Operators depend on area forecasts and pilot reports to make Go/NoGo 
decisions.  Some flight routes have long distances between weather stations; for example, the route from 
Yakutat to Sitka is 201 nautical miles between weather stations.  
Table 7-1 shows examples of flight routes without enroute or destination weather reports.  All 
these routes are entirely in coastal areas where advection fog is common due to moist air being moved 
onshore by normal cyclonic flow around lows and cooled by cold ground.  This often results in 
destination weather with low ceilings and visibility. Aviators may fly longer than one hour—assuming a 
cruising speed of 110 nautical miles an hour for the typical single-engine aircraft used in southeast 
Alaska—on some routes without the benefit of weather reports. 
Table 7-1. Typical Southeast Alaska Routes Without En Route  
and Destination Weather Reports 
Route Distance (nautical miles) 
Juneau (JNU) to Elfin Cove (ELV) 80 
Ketchikan (KTN) to Port Alice (16K)  80 
Sitka (SIT) to Whale Pass (96Z) 100 
Sitka (SIT) to Port Protection (19P) 75 
Source: Leonard Kirk, UAA Capstone Office  
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7.3. Weather Data Summary 
Analyzing weather is an important tool in comparing activities over the course of this study.  
Several organizations compile historical weather data:  
1) The National Weather Service, in cooperation with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and 
the Institute of Agricultural Sciences, University of Alaska 
2) The Environmental Data Service and Air Weather Service of the U.S. Air Force 
3) The Alaska Weather Almanac 
4) NOAA records of historical weather (the Alaska Climate Data Center contains archives of 
NOAA weather observations for all locations in Alaska from 1992 to the present.) 
5) The Western Regional Climate Center (WRCC) is one of six regional climate centers in the 
United States administered by NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center.  The WRCC 
performs several distinct functions, including maintaining historical climate databases for 
western states observation stations and responding to public inquiries for climate information. 
For this analysis we obtained a consistent and complete set of weather data for the entire period 
from the Western Regional Climate Center.  We received hourly ASOS reports, taken from NWS and 
FAA stations in the region.  Table 7-2 shows weather reporting locations we used for our analysis and 
type of report each provides.  Data came in the form of delimited text; we imported the data into SPSS, 
and then cleaned the data using a combination of syntax scripts and visual inspection.  Cleaning the data 
included dropping corrected observations, assuring that values appeared in the respective fields, and 
picking out instances of repeated observations.  We then matched in data from the U.S. Naval 
Observatory identifying civil twilight each day, allowing us to categorize observations by day and night.  
Table 7-2. Weather Reporting Sites for Historical Analysis 
Location Weather Station Identifier Type of Reporting 
Juneau PAJN ASOS. FAA 
Ketchikan PAKT ASOS. FAA 
Sitka PASI ASOS. FAA 
Yakutat PAYA ASOS. NWS 
Source: 
Western Regional Climate Center Desert Research Institute http://www.wrcc.dri.edu 
U.S. Naval Observatory http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/RS_OneYear.html 
We wanted to summarize the weather over a period of time, so we could later compare weather 
during the study period with weather during the baseline.  We categorized each weather observation based 
on the classes  described in Table 7-3, and generated tables and graphs by aggregating data by day and 
month, night and day, and community, and then by weather class.   
Table 7-3  Weather Classes for Baseline Weather Analysis 
Class 0 Ceiling less than 500’ and visibility less than 1 mile 
Class 1 Ceiling 500’ or greater and visibility 1 mile or greater. 
Class 2 Ceiling 500’ or greater and visibility 2 miles or greater 
Class 3 Ceiling 1000’ or greater and visibility 3 miles or greater. 
Class 4 Ceiling 2000’ or greater and visibility 3 miles or greater. 
Class 5 Ceiling 10,000’ or greater and visibility 6 miles or greater. 
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Weather Observations 
Figures 7-1 to 7-4 show the percentage of total observations within each weather class (zero to 
five) that occurred during the daytime.  Looking across from 1998 to 2002, we can see that the weather is 
fairly consistent year to year in all locations.  There was very little annual variance, with the exception of 
the years 1998 and 2001.  The data suggest that during these two years there was a higher frequency of 
observations above Basic VFR conditions overall.  The difference, however, does not suggest any 
extreme annual weather changes in the region as a whole.  
Figure 7-1     Figure 7-2 

































Figure 7-3      Figure 7-4 

































Source: Western Regional Climate Center Desert 
Research Institute http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/ 
U.S. Naval Observatory 
http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/RS_OneYear.html 
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Figures 7-5 to 7-12 graph the percentage of days and nights during which there was at least one 
observation when the weather was below basic Visual Flight Rules criteria (class 2 from table 7-3).  We 
present the data by month (e.g., the average of the five January months, 1998 to 2002) to illustrate how 
typical weather varies by month. Note that there are more daytime observations during summer months 
and fewer during the winter. Figures 7-5 and 7-6 show Juneau day and night data, 7-7 and 7-8 show 
Ketchikan, 7-9 and 7-10 show Sitka, and 7-11 and 7-12 show Yakutat.  This set of figures focuses on how 
often the weather is bad in each community.     
Figure 7-5      Figure 7-6 
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Figure 7-7      Figure 7-8 
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Source: 
Western Regional Climate Center Desert 
Research Institute http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/ 
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Figure 7-9      Figure 7-10 
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Figure 7-11      Figure 7-12 
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The next graphs, 7-13 to 7-20, parallel the previous set of graphs (7-5 through 7-12), but this time 
focusing on how often the weather is good.  They show the percent of days during which the best 
observation was class 4 or better (Night VFR criteria or better).  In most months, there was some time in 
every day when pilots could fly in VFR.  
Figure 7-13      Figure 7-14     








Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec








Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
 
Figure 7-15      Figure 7-16 
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Source: 
Western Regional Climate Center Desert 
Research Institute http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/ 
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Figure 7-17      Figure 7-18 
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Figure 7-19      Figure 7-20 
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Source: 
Western Regional Climate Center Desert Research Institute 
http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/ 
U.S. Naval Observatory 
http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/RS_OneYear.html 
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We have not analyzed how long those good weather periods lasted, and on some days the good 
weather was probably brief.  For example, Juneau December weather observations show many low-
classed (poor weather) and high-classed (good weather) observations.  That means that pilots may take off 
in good weather but return in poor weather.  Figures 7-21 to 7-28 show how many days each month 
showed this sort of variable weather.  This occurrence is graphed out in figures 7-21 to 7-28 as the 
percentage of days with variable weather. 
We define variable weather days as those on which the best weather observation met Basic VFR 
minimums of 1,000’ ceiling, 3 miles visibility and the worst weather observation did not meet Day En 
Route VFR minimums of 500’ ceiling, 2 miles visibility.  These days represent higher danger because the 
weather changes markedly.  On such days, pilots may be lured into flight during the good weather 
moments, but the weather may deteriorate before the flight is finished.  Taking Juneau for example, the 
graph of variability (days with good and bad weather, 7-21) is nearly the same as the graph of below VFR 
days (7-5).  With nearly every bad-weather day including some time with weather good enough for VFR 
flight, the scenario above can occur frequently.  It is important to note these monthly and daily trends 
while trying to incorporate weather information and flight safety.  Many accidents are weather or 
visibility related, so understanding the variance of weather as well as its typical trends can help explain 
this correlation. 
Figure 7-21      Figure 7-22 
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Figure 7-23     Figure 7-24 
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Source: 
Western Regional Climate Center Desert 
Research Institute http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/ 
U.S. Naval Observatory 
http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/RS_OneYear.html 
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Figure 7-25     Figure 7-26 
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Figure 7-27     Figure 7-28 
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8. Baseline Surveys 
8.1. Purpose 
To assess the effects of the Capstone program on air safety in its southeast Alaska region, we 
need to control for other factors that might also affect safety in that area. Among those are changes in the 
qualifications and experience of Capstone area pilots during the study period; changes in company 
operations and policies; and other safety initiatives in the region.  To assess how these factors might 
change, we collected baseline data from air carriers supervised by the Juneau FSDO and from their pilots.  
These surveys were part of a larger effort to collect information about qualifications, practices, 
and attitudes of pilots and company management for aviation operators in Alaska.  ISER developed and 
conducted most of these surveys as part of a contract with the National Institutes for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) in the fall and winter of 2001/2002, and we conducted additional surveys in April 
2003.  Those surveys added three companies that had not been part of our initial sample and added 
Capstone attitude questions as well.  Full details of our survey methodology, copies of the survey 
instruments, and frequency counts are included as appendixes.   
8.2. Results 
Operators 
Our operator survey universe consisted of all the air carriers supervised by the FAA’s Juneau 
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) and pilots who worked for them.  Our NIOSH sampling design 
called for attempting to interview all operators who employed three or more pilots, and interviewing a 
sample of operators with only one or two pilots.  We obtained 20 operator interviews and 38 interviews 
with southeast pilots in 2001/2002, and added three more operators when we returned in April 2003.  
Table 8-1 shows the operators we interviewed. 
Table 8-1.  Companies Included in Southeast Baseline Interviews  
Pacific Wing 
Family Air Tours LLC 
Misty Fjords Air & Outfitting 
Prince of Wales Air Taxi 
Nordic Air 
Sunrise Aviation 
Gulf Air Taxi 
Southeast Aviation 
Pacific Airways 
Island Wings Air Svc 
Harris Aircraft Services 
North Star Helicopters 
Air Excursions 
AK Seaplanes Svc 
AK Juneau Aeronautics 
Venture Travel 
LAB Flying Svc 
Skagway Air Service 
Coastal Helicopters 
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Survey results covered a wide variety of topics.  These operators ranged from employing only one 
pilot to as many as 27 pilots (while at their peak summer operations).  Seasonality of pilot employment 
was evident; on average, the number of pilots employed across all 23 companies was 7.96 in the summer 
and only 3.24 in the winter.  Reflecting the importance of air taxi and charter service to southeast 
aviation, companies flew, on average, more than twice as many unscheduled hours as scheduled:  2,248 
unscheduled hours in 2000, compared with 1,006 scheduled hours that year.  The importance of 
unscheduled service is further underscored by the fact that only about 30 percent of our respondents 
thought that on-time delivery of cargo, passengers, or mail was “very important” to the financial success 
of their company—about the same share as those who said such factors didn’t apply to their companies. 
Together, the companies we surveyed accounted for about 80 new pilot hires each year.  They 
cited a variety of qualifications as important in hiring, including experience flying in southeast Alaska, 
pilot safety history, recommendations, flight evaluation, ability to handle stress and make good decisions, 
maturity, attitude, personality, and formal training. 
We asked whether company management thought that each of 17 possible safety measures could 
be very effective, somewhat effective, or not effective at improving aviation safety in Alaska.  We then 
asked them to pick the three most important.  Table 8-2 shows the result of this ranking.  Although pilot 
training for better decision making was the highest ranked single measure, four of the five weather-related 
measures ranked in the table—so weather information was clearly the greatest concern. 
Table 8-2.  Safety Measures Operators Ranked as One of the Two Most Important 
Description # of 
Respondents 
Pilot training Improvements 
b. Pilot training improvements in decision-making 13 
d. Pilot training improvements in regional hazards 2 
Company Policies and procedures 
g. Pay based on salary rather than flight hours or flights 3 
h. More flight time required of new pilots 4 
i. Better checks of a pilot’s flying history before hiring 2 
Weather 
j. More locations with manned weather reporting 6 
l. Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 2 
m. Increased and improved use of video cameras, such as mountain pass cameras 10 
n. Improved passenger understanding of weather hazards 1 
Operating Environment 
q. Financial incentives (e.g., lower insurance rates, preference in mail contracts) for 
flights or flight hours without accidents/incidents 2 
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Operator Opinions about Capstone 
In April 2003, we asked 12 southeast operators, all of whom had some familiarity with 
Capstone’s Phase II program, about their expectations for and beliefs about Capstone.  We asked first 
about 11 potential benefits to aviation in southeast Alaska, asked what other benefits (if any) they 
expected to see, and which three benefits they though were the most important.  Table 8-3 summarizes 
which benefits most operators expect to value the most. 
Table 8-3.  Top Potential Capstone Benefits 





j. Improved terrain awareness for pilots 9 
d. Fewer near mid-air collisions 5 
k. Improved search and rescue capabilities 4 
i. Time savings from direct flights 3 
a. Fewer cancelled flights/instrument 
approaches 2 
g. Improved SVFR procedures 2 
h. Easier in-flight diversions or re-routes 1 
Emergency support 1 
e. More useful weather info 1 
c. Safer flying in minimum legal VFR 
conditions 1 
 
Unsurprisingly, the benefits Capstone was primarily designed to provide—terrain awareness and 
fewer mid-air collisions—are at the top of the list.  Southeast operators also rated search and rescue 
highly, perhaps because of Capstone’s successful use during a recent search in southwest Alaska.  We did 
not ask about every aspect of potential benefits. Several operators cited as “other benefits” new minimum 
enroute altitudes for some southeast Alaska routes, although these did not make their “most important 
three” lists. 
We asked about potential Capstone problems stemming from heavier cockpit workloads, less 
heads-up time, or congested point-to-point routes.  Most of our respondents (10, 7, and 11 respectively) 
thought these would be at most minor problems.  However, respondents cited as possible other problems 
overconfidence, using equipment to push the weather, and attempting to use the equipment to fly into 
instrument meteorological conditions while under visual flight rules.  Several also cited concerns about 
their aircraft being grounded if Capstone equipment failed. 
We asked why pilots might choose not to use Capstone equipment; most respondents (7) thought 
that the potential for the company to watch the aircraft was the only listed reason they agreed with; 
however, 7 also added that concern about the FAA watching aircraft was also a reason.  Table 8-4 shows 
which of their concerns (both problems with the equipment and reasons not to use it) they considered 
among the three most serious. 
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Table 8-4.  Most Serious Operator Concerns about Capstone,  
April 2003 
Problem # of 
Responses 
Too distracting/Less heads-up time 5 
Too difficult to use 1 
Learning required to upgrade to IFR capability 1 
Using equipment in lieu of training/over reliance on equip 2 
Maintenance problems 1 
Grounding a/c due to equipment problems 3 
Don’t want company/FAA watching 4 
Overconfidence in marginal weather 2 
Using equipment for bootleg IFR  1 
Don’t trust equipment 2 
Initial lack of GBT’s to receive information at home base 1 
 
Pilot Characteristics 
As with pilots throughout Alaska, pilots for our southeast operators have a wide range of 
experience.  Their total flight time ranged from 1,500 to 26,000 hours and Alaska flight time from 300 to 
26,000 hours.  They averaged over 5,000 hours of flight experience.  Not all were qualified and current to 
fly under instrument flight rules; almost 40 percent had never flown on instruments in Alaska. 
As with many Alaska businesses, aviation is busy in the summer months.  During peak season, 
pilots worked an average of 12 hours per day, at least 5 days per week. Figure 8-1 shows the distribution 
of their reported weekly work hours.  Despite these long hours, fewer than one in seven of our pilots 
reported that fatigue made them wish they could decline a flight as often as once a month.  
Figure 8-1 
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As in southwest Alaska, pilots in the southeast area are very concerned with the weather.  We 
asked about how often they flew into unknown or changed weather conditions and about how accurate 
they found flight service station weather information.  Over 90 percent reported that flight service station 
weather was accurate always or most of the time.  However, as Table 8-5 shows, most also fly into 
unknown or changing weather on a regular basis.  Over 80 percent do so at least monthly.  All the pilots 
who responded told us that they had declined a flight for weather reasons while working for their current 
employer, and all reported that their employer supported their decisions. 
Table 8-5.  How Often Do Pilots Fly into Unknown or Changing Weather? 
(Percent of Respondent Pilots) 
 
How often do you have to decide whether to fly 
into unknown weather conditions that may 
deteriorate below VFR minimums? 
How often do you fly into weather that is 
different from what was predicted when 
you started your flight? 
Daily 24% 15% 
Weekly 34% 46% 
Monthly 24% 18% 
Less than Monthly 16% 21% 
Never 3% 0% 
The importance of weather was again shown in pilot responses to the same 17 potential safety 
measures that we asked operators about. Pilots, like operators, chose more training in pilot decision 
making as the most important (Table 8-6).  Again like operators, pilots said more weather reporting was 
the second most important measure (although operators chose AWOS stations and pilots chose manned 
weather reporting). And again, pilots chose four of the five listed weather measures as among the most 
important.  However, pilots saw other types of pilot training (beyond decision making) as also important. 
Table 8-6.  Safety Measures Pilots Ranked as One of the Two Most Important 
Description # of Respondents 
Pilot Training 
a. Pilot training improvements in meteorology 6 
b. Pilot training improvements in decision-making 20 
c. Pilot training improvements in white-out/flat-light conditions 3 
d. Pilot training improvements in regional hazards 4 
Company Policies 
f. Rewards from management for flights or flight hours  1 
g. Pay based on salary rather than flight hours or flights 5 
h. More flight time required of new pilots 5 
Weather 
j. More locations with manned weather reporting 12 
k. More locations with automated weather reporting 2 
l. Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 3 
m. Increased and improved use of video cameras, such as mountain pass 
cameras 4 
Operating Environment 
p. More time to deliver by-pass mail before it’s switched to another operator 1 
q. Financial incentives (e.g., lower insurance rates, preference in mail contracts) 
for flights or flight hours without accidents/incidents 9 
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Finally, pilots in southeast Alaska did not see their jobs as extraordinarily dangerous.  As Figure 
8-2 shows, fewer than 10 percent thought that piloting was safer than other jobs, but similarly few thought 
that it was much more dangerous.  About one-third thought that piloting is about as safe as other jobs and 
the largest group—just over half—thought it was just slightly more dangerous than other jobs. 
 
Figure 8-2. 
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Appendix A.  Southeast Accidents, 1990-2001 
 
The table below summarizes Southeast Alaska accidents from 1990 through 2001.  Cause category 
explanations are listed below, with the abbreviations used in the table in parentheses.  
 
•  Mechanical Failure:  Engine failure, inoperable control surfaces, failed landing gear, 
propeller or shaft failure.   
•  Navigation (CFIT, TCF): Usually Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) while en route, 
most often associated with reduced visibility.  In the YK Delta, CFIT also occurs in 
nominal VFR conditions when “flat light” on snow-covered ground prevents recognition 
of terrain.  Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF) warnings are a Terrain Awareness and 
Warning System (TAWS) function planned for Capstone Phase 2 that addresses the 20%-
30% of CFIT accidents on approach or departure.  These are not directly addressed by 
Capstone Phase 1 avionics.  Rarely, accidents are due to disorientation, which can be 
addressed by a GPS-map display.   
•  Traffic:  Usually mid-air collisions or near mid-air collisions (NMACs) between aircraft.  
Also includes accidents from last-moment avoidance of other aircraft and from jet blast 
on airport surface.  
•  Flight Information (Weather, Ice, IMC): Usually inadequate weather information, 
especially icing, but also visibility; rarely convective weather.  (Surface winds 
contributing to take-off or landing accidents have been included under take-off or landing 
rather than here.)  Occasionally, lack of information on changes in procedures or facility 
status.  
•  Maneuvering:  Accidents while maneuvering during the cruise phase of flight. 
•  Fuel:  Usually fuel exhaustion.  Occasionally, failure to switch fuel tanks.  
•  Flight Preparation:  Failure to ensure cargo is tied-down and within the aircraft’s 
weight and balance limits.  Failure to check fuel for the presence of water, failure to 
remove ice or snow from the aircraft – often resulting in serious or fatal accidents.  
•  Take-off and Landing:  Failure to maintain control (especially in wind), improper 
airspeed, or inadequate care near vehicles or obstacles. Accidents due to poor runway 
conditions, hazards at off-runway sites such as beaches and gravel bars, or from obstacles 
in water that are struck by float-planes.  
•  Other (water taxi):  Includes a variety of unusual causes such as bird strikes, colliding 
with debris in lakes, rivers and oceans, collisions with ground vehicles and pilots under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
•  Unknown:  Undetermined causes, missing aircraft. 
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DEN90FA053 135 as 91 7-Feb-1990 Fatal Weather yes 
SEA90LA053 135 as 91 18-Mar-1990 Serious Other no 
ANC90LA049 091 31-Mar-1990 None Other no 
ANC90LA059 091 15-Apr-1990 None Take-off no 
SEA90LA078 091 16-May-1990 None Landing no 
SEA90LA083 133 21-May-1990 Serious Mechanical no 
SEA90LA088 135 29-May-1990 Minor Other no 
SEA90LA089 135 29-May-1990 None Other no 
ANC90LA090A 135 17-Jun-1990 None Traffic yes 
ANC90LA090B 135 17-Jun-1990 None Traffic yes 
SEA90LA114 091 28-Jun-1990 None Landing no 
ANC90LA129 091 2-Aug-1990 None Mechanical no 
ANC90LA141 091 11-Aug-1990 None Landing no 
SEA90FA163 135 12-Aug-1990 Fatal Other no 
ANC90LA147 135 17-Aug-1990 None Mechanical no 
ANC90FA158 091 28-Aug-1990 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC90LA160 091 1-Sep-1990 None Fuel no 
ANC91FA001 135 4-Oct-1990 Serious Take-off no 
ANC91LA011 091 7-Nov-1990 Minor Take-off no 
ANC91LA013 135 as 91 13-Nov-1990 None Landing no 
ANC91LA021 135 18-Jan-1991 Serious Navigation yes 
ANC91FA050A 091 9-Apr-1991 Fatal Traffic yes 
ANC91FA050B 091 9-Apr-1991 Fatal Traffic yes 
ANC91LA059 133 22-May-1991 Minor Mechanical no 
ANC91LA088 091 2-Jul-1991 None Take-off no 
ANC91LA106 135 as 91 24-Jul-1991 None Mechanical no 
ANC91LA110 091 28-Jul-1991 None Mechanical no 
ANC91LA112 091 29-Jul-1991 None Flight Prep no 
ANC91LA119 135 10-Aug-1991 Serious Other no 
SEA91FA207 135 14-Aug-1991 Fatal Weather yes 
SEA91FA216 135 20-Aug-1991 Fatal Weather yes 
ANC91LA159 091 26-Aug-1991 None Landing no 
ANC91LA137 091 29-Aug-1991 None Take-off no 
ANC91LA138 091 30-Aug-1991 None Other no 
SEA92LA011 133 11-Oct-1991 Serious Mechanical no 
ANC92LA009 091 13-Oct-1991 None Take-off no 
ANC92FA005 091 15-Oct-1991 Minor Mechanical no 
ANC92LA019 135 as 91 14-Dec-1991 Fatal Other no 
ANC92LA023 135 25-Dec-1991 Minor Weather yes 
ANC92LA032 135 4-Feb-1992 None Mechanical no 
ANC92LA033 091 9-Feb-1992 Fatal Other no 
ANC92LA037 135 as 91 17-Feb-1992 None Landing no 
ANC92LA039 135 as 91 19-Feb-1992 Minor Take-off no 
ANC92FA040 133 23-Feb-1992 Fatal Mechanical no 
ANC92FA044 133 6-Mar-1992 Serious Mechanical no 
ANC92LA047 091 15-Mar-1992 None Landing no 
ANC92T#A04 PUBU 26-Mar-1992 None   
ANC92LA062 091 18-Apr-1992 None Take-off no 
ANC92FAMS2 091 3-May-1992 Fatal Unknown no 
ANC92LA079 135 25-May-1992 None Weather yes 
ANC92LA082 091 29-May-1992 Minor Landing no 
ANC92LA085 091 2-Jun-1992 Fatal Take-off no 
ANC92LA090 135 10-Jun-1992 None Landing no 
ANC92LA111 091 24-Jul-1992 None Mechanical no 
ANC92LA115 135 as 91 29-Jul-1992 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC92LA119 135 6-Aug-1992 Serious Navigation yes 
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ANC92LA120 135 as 91 6-Aug-1992 None Take-off no 
ANC92LA121 091 8-Aug-1992 Minor Other no 
ANC92LA151 135 29-Aug-1992 None Landing no 
ANC92LA178 135 25-Sep-1992 Minor Other no 
ANC92LA181 135 29-Sep-1992 None Take-off no 
ANC93LA002 091 3-Oct-1992 None Landing no 
ANC93FA012 135 6-Nov-1992 Fatal Weather yes 
ANC93LA015 133 10-Nov-1992 None Landing no 
ANC93LA022 091 23-Dec-1992 None Other no 
ANC93LA023 135 as 91 24-Dec-1992 None Flight Prep no 
ANC93LA030 135 as 91 4-Feb-1993 None Take-off no 
ANC93FA033 133 19-Feb-1993 Fatal Mechanical no 
ANC93LA043 135 as 91 12-Mar-1993 None Take-off no 
ANC93FA056 133 2-May-1993 Fatal Mechanical no 
ANC93FA061 133 8-May-1993 Minor Mechanical no 
ANC93LA066 091 19-May-1993 None Other no 
ANC93LA075 091 31-May-1993 None Landing no 
ANC93LA077 135 2-Jun-1993 Minor Mechanical no 
ANC93LA095 135 as 91 17-Jun-1993 None Mechanical no 
ANC93T#A02  17-Jun-1993 None   
ANC93LA096 135 18-Jun-1993 Minor Navigation yes 
ANC93LA101 091 23-Jun-1993 None Mechanical no 
ANC93LA104 135 as 91 28-Jun-1993 None Landing no 
ANC93LA118 091 15-Jul-1993 None Landing no 
ANC93LA125 135 23-Jul-1993 None Mechanical no 
ANC93LA130 091 30-Jul-1993 Fatal Weather yes 
ANC93T#A03  2-Aug-1993 None   
ANC93LA184 135 17-Sep-1993 None Take-off no 
ANC94LA012 091 5-Oct-1993 None Mechanical no 
ANC94LA024 091 8-Dec-1993 None Landing no 
ANC94LA042 135 26-Mar-1994 Minor Landing no 
ANC94LA053 091 1-May-1994 None Fuel no 
ANC94LA067 135 8-Jun-1994 None Landing no 
ANC94FA070 135 22-Jun-1994 Fatal Weather yes 
ANC94FA089 135 19-Jul-1994 None Mechanical no 
ANC94LA091 091 21-Jul-1994 None Fuel no 
ANC94LA098 091 5-Aug-1994 None Mechanical no 
ANC94LA121 091 18-Aug-1994 None Mechanical no 
ANC94LA139 091 18-Aug-1994 None Landing no 
ANC94LA110 135 as 91 30-Aug-1994 None Landing no 
SEA94FA245 135 as 91 22-Sep-1994 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC95LA012 135 20-Nov-1994 Fatal Other no 
ANC95LA015 091 5-Dec-1994 Serious Weather yes 
ANC95LA021 091 17-Dec-1994 None Take-off no 
ANC95LA023 135 2-Jan-1995 None Landing no 
ANC95LA034 135 10-Mar-1995 Serious Weather yes 
ANC95LA051 135 as 91 30-Apr-1995 None Landing no 
ANC95LA062 135 31-May-1995 None Landing no 
ANC95LA072 091 9-Jun-1995 None Landing no 
ANC95LA075 135 as 91 12-Jun-1995 Minor Mechanical no 
ANC95LA081 135 24-Jun-1995 None Landing no 
ANC95FA101 135 7-Jul-1995 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC95LA103 135 13-Jul-1995 None Mechanical no 
ANC95LA119 091 29-Jul-1995 Fatal Mechanical no 
ANC95LA130 091 4-Aug-1995 None Flight Prep no 
ANC95LA134 091 8-Aug-1995 Serious Take-off no 
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ANC95LA135 091 10-Aug-1995 None Take-off no 
ANC95FA167 091 14-Sep-1995 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC95LA176 091 23-Sep-1995 None Other no 
ANC96LA001 091 6-Oct-1995 Minor Flight Prep no 
ANC96LA008 091 22-Oct-1995 None Landing no 
ANC96LA014 091 12-Nov-1995 None Navigation yes 
ANC96LA029 135 as 91 4-Mar-1996 Minor Mechanical no 
ANC96TA075 PUBU 20-May-1996 None Landing no 
ANC96FA079 091 24-May-1996 Fatal Mechanical no 
ANC96TA087 PUBU 11-Jun-1996 None Landing no 
ANC96LA088 135 as 91 14-Jun-1996 None Mechanical no 
ANC96TA092 091 26-Jun-1996 None Landing no 
ANC96LA097 135 as 91 7-Jul-1996 None Landing no 
ANC96FA098 133 13-Jul-1996 Fatal Mechanical no 
ANC96LA100 091 17-Jul-1996 None Landing no 
ANC96FA101 135 19-Jul-1996 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC96FA139 135 as 91 31-Aug-1996 Fatal Landing no 
ANC96FA137 135 1-Sep-1996 Serious Weather yes 
ANC97FA001 135 13-Oct-1996 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC97LA004 091 18-Oct-1996 Serious Flight Prep no 
ANC97LA005 135 as 91 29-Oct-1996 None Mechanical no 
ANC97LA014 135 12-Dec-1996 Fatal Take-off no 
ANC97LA015 121 22-Dec-1996 Serious Weather yes 
ANC97LA020 091 13-Jan-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97LA078 091 23-Feb-1997 None Other no 
ANC97FA031 091 7-Mar-1997 Fatal Flight Prep no 
ANC97LA038 091 26-Mar-1997 Minor Navigation yes 
ANC97LA050 091 31-Mar-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97FA051A 091 9-Apr-1997 Fatal Traffic yes 
ANC97FA051B 091 9-Apr-1997 Fatal Traffic yes 
ANC97LA058 091 16-Apr-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97LA071 091 12-May-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97LA082 091 18-May-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97LA076 091 21-May-1997 Minor Landing no 
ANC97LA086 135 as 91 19-Jun-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97LA087 091 22-Jun-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97LA105 091 22-Jun-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97FA097 135 3-Jul-1997 Fatal Mechanical no 
ANC97LA114 091 1-Aug-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97LA141 091 2-Sep-1997 None Mechanical no 
ANC97FA143 091 6-Sep-1997 Fatal Mechanical no 
ANC97LA156 091 26-Sep-1997 None Landing no 
ANC97FA159 135 as 91 29-Sep-1997 Fatal Other no 
ANC98FA006 135 23-Oct-1997 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC98LA016 091 22-Jan-1998 None Landing no 
ANC98LA037 091 12-Apr-1998 Minor Landing no 
ANC98FA043 091 27-Apr-1998 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC98FA061A 135 30-May-1998 Fatal Traffic yes 
ANC98FA061B 091 30-May-1998 Fatal Traffic yes 
ANC98FA069 135 9-Jun-1998 None Mechanical no 
ANC98LA071 091 12-Jun-1998 None Take-off no 
ANC98LA084 091 23-Jun-1998 Minor Landing no 
ANC98LA107 091 23-Jul-1998 Minor Take-off no 
ANC98FA116 135 5-Aug-1998 Fatal Fuel no 
ANC98LA122 121 14-Aug-1998 None Landing no 
ANC98LA126 091 18-Aug-1998 None Landing no 
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ANC98LA127 091 19-Aug-1998 None Take-off no 
ANC98LA139 091 3-Sep-1998 Minor Landing no 
ANC98FA168 091 29-Sep-1998 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC99LA049 091 22-Apr-1999  Landing no 
ANC99LA052 135 27-Apr-1999 Serious Mechanical no 
ANC99FAMS1 091 2-May-1999 Fatal Unknown no 
ANC99TA058 133 5-May-1999 Fatal Other no 
ANC99FA073 135 9-Jun-1999 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC99LA072 135 9-Jun-1999 Minor Take-off no 
ANC99LA089 091 3-Jul-1999 None Landing no 
ANC99LA092 091 15-Jul-1999 Minor Landing no 
ANC99LA100 135 as 91 30-Jul-1999 None Fuel no 
ANC99LA102 091 1-Aug-1999 None Landing no 
ANC99LA107A 121 7-Aug-1999 None Traffic yes 
ANC99LA107B 121 7-Aug-1999 None Traffic yes 
ANC99FA108 091 8-Aug-1999 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC99LA114 135 as 91 15-Aug-1999 None Mechanical no 
ANC99LA136 091 1-Sep-1999 None Take-off no 
ANC99FA139 135 10-Sep-1999 Serious Navigation yes 
ANC99LA140 091 10-Sep-1999 None Weather yes 
ANC99LA141 091 10-Sep-1999 None Weather yes 
ANC00LA002 135 7-Oct-1999 None Landing no 
ANC00LA014 135 as 91 21-Nov-1999 Serious Take-off no 
ANC00LA020 135 23-Dec-1999 None Take-off no 
ANC00LA055 135 as 91 5-May-2000 None Landing no 
ANC00LA061 135 22-May-2000 None Other no 
ANC00FA093 091 20-Jul-2000 Fatal Take-off no 
ANC00LA094 091 25-Jul-2000 Minor Landing no 
ANC00LA104 091 16-Aug-2000 None Landing no 
ANC00LA105 135 16-Aug-2000 None Mechanical no 
ANC00FA110 091 31-Aug-2000 Fatal Other no 
ANC00LA113 091 5-Sep-2000 None Landing no 
ANC00LA132 135 as 91 23-Sep-2000 None Mechanical no 
ANC01LA013 091 28-Oct-2000 None Fuel no 
ANC01FAMS1 135 as 91 27-Dec-2000 Fatal Unknown no 
ANC01LA073 091 23-Jun-2001 None Take-off no 
ANC01LA072 091 24-Jun-2001 None Landing no 
ANC01LA086 091 15-Jul-2001 None Take-off no 
ANC01LA090 135 as 91 26-Jul-2001 None Take-off no 
ANC01WA091 135 26-Jul-2001 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC01FA093 135 30-Jul-2001 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC01LA096 135 30-Jul-2001 None Take-off no 
ANC01LA109 133 11-Aug-2001 None Other no 
ANC01LA112 091 11-Aug-2001 None Landing no 
ANC01LA122 091 21-Aug-2001 None Take-off no 
ANC01LA138 091 7-Sep-2001 Minor Mechanical no 
ANC01LA139 091 9-Sep-2001 None Landing no 
ANC02FA010 135 15-Jan-2002 Fatal Weather yes 
ANC02FA028 091 10-Apr-2002 Fatal Other no 
ANC02FA029 135 11-Apr-2002 None Mechanical no 
ANC02LA030 091 14-Apr-2002 None Landing no 
ANC02LA033 091 13-May-2002 None Mechanical no 
ANC02LA053A 135 19-Jun-2002 None Traffic yes 
ANC02LA053B 135 19-Jun-2002 None Traffic yes 
ANC02LA069 135 25-Jun-2002 Minor Landing no 
ANC02LA076 135 12-Jul-2002 None Landing no 
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ANC02LA080 091 17-Jul-2002 None Take-off no 
ANC02LA098A 135 19-Aug-2002 None Traffic yes 
ANC02LA098B 135 19-Aug-2002 None Traffic yes 
ANC02FA108 091 28-Aug-2002 Fatal Navigation yes 
ANC02LA115 135 4-Sep-2002 None Other no 
ANC02LA125 091 11-Sep-2002 None Take-off no 
ANC03CA003 091 17-Oct-2002 Minor Navigation yes 
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Appendix B.  Southeast Alaska Airports and Community Population 
Capstone Phase II Baseline Report  Appendices 
  B-2 
Table B-1. Southeast Alaska Airports 
 
Name Associated City Type Use Owner
ALASCOM/COASTAL LENA POINT JUNEAU HELIPORT PRIVATE ALASCOM
ALSEK RIVER YAKUTAT AIRPORT PUBLIC USFS CHATHAM AREA
ANGOON ANGOON SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC ST OF AK DOTPF/SE REGION
ANNETTE ISLAND ANNETTE AIRPORT PRIVATE METLAKATLA INDIAN COMM
BARTLETT COVE BARTLETT COVE SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC U.S. GOVERNMENT
BELL ISLAND HOT SPRINGS BELL ISLAND SEAPLANE BASE PRIVATE DONALD PETERSON
CAPE DECISION C. G. CAPE DECISION HELIPORT PRIVATE U S GOVT
CAPE POLE CAPE POLE SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC L.O.G. LOG CO.
CAPE SPENCER C.G. CAPE SPENCER HELIPORT PRIVATE U S GOVT
CHATHAM CHATHAM SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC PUBLIC DOMAIN
COFFMAN COVE COFFMAN COVE SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
CORDOVA MUNI CORDOVA AIRPORT PUBLIC STATE OF ALASKA DOTPF N REG
MERLE K (MUDHOLE) SMITH CORDOVA AIRPORT PUBLIC STATE OF ALASKA DOTPF N REG
CRAIG CRAIG SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC CITY OF CRAIG
CRAIG CG CRAIG HELIPORT PRIVATE U S COAST GUARD
DANGEROUS RIVER YAKUTAT AIRPORT PUBLIC USFS CHATHAM AREA
EAST ALSEK RIVER YAKUTAT AIRPORT PUBLIC NATL PARK SERVICE
ELDRED ROCK CG ELDRED ROCK HELIPORT PRIVATE U S GOVT
ELFIN COVE ELFIN COVE SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-CENTRAL RGN
ENTRANCE ISLAND ENTRANCE ISLAND SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-CENTRAL RGN
EXCURSION INLET EXCURSION INLET SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
FALSE ISLAND FALSE ISLAND SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC ALASKA LOG & PULP CO
FIVE FINGER CG FIVE FINGER HELIPORT PRIVATE U S GOVT
FUNTER BAY FUNTER BAY SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
GUSTAVUS GUSTAVUS AIRPORT PUBLIC ST OF AK DOT SE REGION
HAINES HAINES AIRPORT PUBLIC ST OF AK DOTPF SE REG
SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC ST OF AK SE REG
HARLEQUIN LAKE YAKUTAT AIRPORT PUBLIC USFS CHATHAM AREA
HAWK INLET HAWK INLET SEAPLANE BASE PRIVATE GREEN CREEK MINING CO.
HOLLIS HOLLIS SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
HOONAH HOONAH AIRPORT PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF SE RGN
SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
HYDABURG HYDABURG SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
HYDER HYDER SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-CENTRAL RGN
ICY BAY ICY BAY AIRPORT PRIVATE STATE OF ALASKA
JUNEAU HARBOR JUNEAU SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC PUBLIC DOMAIN
JUNEAU INTL JUNEAU AIRPORT PUBLIC CITY OF JUNEAU
KAKE KAKE AIRPORT PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF SE REG
SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
KASAAN KASAAN SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
KETCHIKAN /TEMSCO H/ KETCHIKAN HELIPORT PRIVATE TEMSCO HELIC
KETCHIKAN HARBOR KETCHIKAN SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC PUBLIC DOMAIN
KETCHIKAN INTL KETCHIKAN AIRPORT PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF SE RGN
KLAWOCK KLAWOCK AIRPORT PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF/SE REGION
SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC ST OF AK DOT, PF SE REG.
LLOYD R. ROUNDTREE SEAPLANE FACILITY PETERSBURG SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC ST OF AK DOTPF SE REG
LORING LORING SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
METLAKATLA METLAKATLA SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-CENTRAL RGN
MEYERS CHUCK MEYERS CHUCK SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
MURPHYS PULLOUT KETCHIKAN SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC KETCHIKAN GATEWAY BOROUGH
NICHIN COVE TUXEKAN ISLAND SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC PANHANDLE LOGGING CO
NORTH DOUGLAS JUNEAU HELIPORT PRIVATE ERA AVIATION, INC.
NORTH WHALE NORTH WHALE PASS SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC KETCHIKAN PULP CO
PELICAN PELICAN SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
PENINSULA POINT PULLOUT KETCHIKAN SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
PETERSBURG JAMES A JOHNSON PETERSBURG AIRPORT PUBLIC ST OF AK DOTPF SE REG
POINT BAKER POINT BAKER SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE RGN
Southeast Alaska  Airports
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Name Associated City Type Use Owner
PORT ALEXANDER PORT ALEXANDER SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
PORT ALICE PORT ALICE SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC ALASKA LOGGING & PULP
PORT PROTECTION PORT PROTECTION SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
PORT WALTER PORT WALTER SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC USDI BU OF COMM FISH
SAGINAW SAGINAW BAY SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC M HAMMER
SITKA SITKA SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC CITY & BOROUGH OF SITKA
SITKA ROCKY GUTIERREZ SITKA AIRPORT PUBLIC STATE OF ALASKA DOTPF
SITUK YAKUTAT AIRPORT PUBLIC USFS CHATHAM AREA
SKAGWAY SKAGWAY AIRPORT PUBLIC ST OF AK DOTPF SE REG
SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
SNETTISHAM SNETTISHAM AIRPORT PRIVATE ALASKA POWER ADMIN
STEAMBOAT BAY STEAMBOAT BAY SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC NEW ENGLAND FISH CO.
TAKU HARBOR TAKU HARBOR SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC PUBLIC DOMAIN
TAKU LODGE TAKU LODGE SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC RON MAAS
TAMGAS HARBOR ANNETTE SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC COUNCIL OF ANNETTE IS
TANIS MESA YAKUTAT AIRPORT PUBLIC USFS CHATHAM AREA
TENAKEE TENAKEE SPRINGS SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC CITY OF TENAKEE
THORNE BAY THORNE BAY SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF SE REGION
TOKEEN TOKEEN SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC PUBLIC DOMAIN
WARM SPRING BAY BARANOF SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF-SE-REG
WATERFALL WATERFALL SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC WATERFALL CANNERY RESORT
WRANGELL WRANGELL AIRPORT PUBLIC ST OF AK DOT/SE REGION
SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC ST OF AK DOT/SE REGION
YAKATAGA YAKATAGA AIRPORT PUBLIC CHUGACH ALASKA CORP
YAKUTAT YAKUTAT AIRPORT PUBLIC ST OF AK DOT SE REG
SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC STATE OF AK DOTPF,SE REG
YES BAY LODGE YES BAY SEAPLANE BASE PUBLIC ART HACK
Southeast Alaska  Airports
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Table B-2. Community Population, 2000 
 
Community Population Community Population
Haines Borough 2392 Sitka City and Borough 8835
      Covenant Life 102       Sitka city and borough 8835
      Excursion Inlet 10 Skagway-Hoonah-Angoon Census Area 3436
      Haines city 1811       Angoon city 572
      Lutak 39       Cube Cove 72
      Mosquito Lake 221       Elfin Cove 32
      Mud Bay 137       Game Creek 35
      Remainder of Haines borough 72       Gustavus 429
Juneau City and Borough 30711       Hobart Bay 3
   Juneau city and borough 30711       Hoonah city 860
Ketchikan Gateway Borough 14059       Pelican city 163
      Ketchikan city 7922       Tenakee Springs city 104
      Saxman city 431       Whitestone Logging Camp 116
      Remainder of Ketchikan borough 5706       Klukwan 139
Prince of Wales-Outer Ketchikan Census Area 6157       Skagway city 862
      Metlakatla 1375       Remainder of Hoonah-Angoon census subarea 49
      Hyder 97 Valdez-Cordova Census Area (Tract 2) 2480
      Meyers Chuck 21       Cordova city 2454
      Coffman Cove city 199 Wrangell-Petersburg Census Area 6684
      Craig 1725       Kake city 710
      Edna Bay 49       Kupreanof city 23
      Hollis 139       Petersburg city 3224
      Hydaburg city 382       Port Alexander city 81
      Kasaan city 39       Thoms Place 22
      Klawock city 854       Wrangell city 2308
      Naukati Bay 135       Remainder of Wrangell-Petersburg census area 316
      Point Baker 35 Yakutat City and Borough 808
      Port Protection 63       Yakutat 680
      Thorne Bay city 557       Remainder of Yakutat borough 128
      Whale Pass 58
      Remainder of Prince of Wales-Outer Ketchikan Census Area 429
Sources: US Census 2000, Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Research and Analysis Section, Demographics Unit.
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Survey Summary Methodology 
NIOSH Operator Questionnaire  
Air Carrier Survey: Capstone questions 
NIOSH Pilot Interview, Fall/Winter 2001/02 
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C-1. Survey Research Methodology 
Objective 
We conducted surveys of both pilots and operators in Southeast Alaska.  These surveys were part 
of a larger effort to collect information about qualifications, practices and attitudes of pilots and company 
management for aviation operators in Alaska.  Based on survey responses, focus group results, and 
consultation with Alaskan aviation safety experts, the National Institutes of Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) will develop policy options designed to reduce aviation fatalities.   
NIOSH contracted with the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) of the University 
of Alaska Anchorage to design and administer two statewide aviation safety surveys, one of air carrier 
managers and one of active commercial pilots.  This document describes the methodology for the pilot 
survey, which addressed pilot demographics, flight hours (total, aircraft type, and instrument hours), 
Alaska flying experience, attitudes about safety, flying practices, and other salient risk factors.  
Instrument Development 
Focus Groups 
We hypothesized that there were measurable differences in attitudes, policies and behaviors of 
pilots and operators that put some pilots and operators at greater risk of a crash than others.  We further 
hypothesize that aspects of the economic and/or regulatory environment may be reinforcing those higher-
risk characteristics.  To investigate these hypotheses, NIOSH conducted focus group meetings between 
May and November of 2000 among pilots, operators, and villagers in five Alaska regions.  Both NIOSH 
and ISER reviewed the findings of previous Alaska aviation studies.  Findings from these two sources 
became the foundation of the research questions, and core of both the pilot and operator survey 
questionnaires.   
Draft Questionnaires 
Respondents were asked to reply to questions about flight practices, attitudes, and perceptions 
from their personal perspective.  The questionnaires covered several areas: 
1. Pilot demographics, certifications and flight experience  
2. Flight experiences in their current employment relevant to the identified safety issues 
3. Training provided by their current employer relevant to the identified safety issues 
4. Operator policies and practices 
5. Attitudes about those safety issues and about potential ways to address them 
6. For operators who may be part of Capstone Phase II, questions about their attitudes about that 
equipment. 
Pre-Test 
The questionnaires were pre-tested on six pilots and six companies to filter out confusing 
questions and terms, confirm that perception and attitude questions worked, and to determine the time 
required to administer the survey.  We also had to deal with sensitivity to questions about practices that 
are contrary to federal aviation regulations (FARs).  In addition to an understandable reluctance to admit 
to breaking the law, some respondents also raised concerns that their survey responses to such questions 
would be used for enforcement purposes.  For the same reasons, we chose not to ask pilots questions 
about their employers that might call for explanations of practices or procedures contrary to FARs. 
Use of previously collected data 
While prior studies examining crashes in commuter and air taxi services have provided useful 
leads on comparative information and examples of how to conduct this type of research, they do not 
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provide the specific information needed for the reduction of deaths related to air crashes in Alaska.  No 
existing information, such as that available from the NTSB or FAA accident data reporting systems, has 
been identified of the type required for these studies.  Additionally, appropriate denominators and 
exposure estimates of commercial pilots are inaccurate and unreliable.  Our review of the scientific and 
technical literature did not yield the number of commercial pilots per year or the number of pilot flight 
hours or flights per year in Alaska.  
Sample Design 
Both pilots and operators were the units of analysis in this study.  The survey population for this 
study consists of  
(1) air carrier companies supervised by the FAA’s Juneau Flight Standards District Office 
(FSDO), as of November 2000, and updated in December, 2002, and  
(2) pilots who flew for those companies:   
Table F-1.  Southeast Operators and Pilots Surveyed  





Operator Sample, Nov. 2000 12 15 27 
Responses from Nov 2000 Operators 6 14 20 
Operator additions in December, 2002 3 0 3 
Total Operator Responses  9 14 23 
Total Pilot Responses 6 30 36 
 
Survey Protocols 
We generated the pilot sample from interviews with the air carrier operators.  ISER interviewed 
operators from August 2001 through February 2002; we interviewed pilots from December 2001 through 
February 2002.  As described above, the universe from which we drew the pilot sample was the pilots 
employed by operators that we interviewed. In the final section of the large operator/company 
questionnaire we requested a list of pilots employed by that carrier and their telephone numbers.  If the 
operator provided the list, the interviewer verified that the number of pilots on the list was the same as the 
number reported in question 1 (pilots currently employed by the carrier).  If the numbers were different, 
the interviewer resolved the inconsistency, either by correcting question 1 or correcting the pilot list, as 
appropriate.  Once the numbers were the same, the interviewer chose a pilot sampling sheet with the same 
number of pilots as listed.  The pilot sampling sheets (generated by an excel spreadsheet) randomly 
selected which pilots on a numbered list should be interviewed.  We generated a new sampling sheet, with 
different random sample, for each company. 
If the operator refused to provide pilot information after follow-up by an interviewer experienced 
in turning around refusals, we tried one of several options.  We preferred option (1) or (2), but used option 
(3) when that was all the operator would agree to.  
1. Work with the operator to obtain contact information only for pilots selected for interview.  We 
would never see the full list of employees.  The interviewer would direct the operator to choose 
names based on where they fell on list.  For example, the interviewer, using a sampling sheet, 
would direct the operator to choose the 3rd, 5th and 8th pilots on the operator’s list.  The operator 
then provided us with names and contact phone numbers for the selected pilots. 
2. Obtain a list of pilot names without contact information; draw the sample and mail the 
questionnaire to the company for delivery to the selected pilots. 
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3. Work with the operator (as above) so that the operator could select the random sample, but in 
addition, have the operator distribute the questionnaires to the selected pilots (rather than 
providing contact information to ISER). 
In all cases when ISER mailed questionnaire to pilots we included a self addressed stamped 
envelope for the pilot to return the questionnaire to ISER.  We also provided a form so that the pilot could 
mail us their telephone number, in which case we would call the pilot directly and conduct the survey 
over the telephone. 
Initially we mailed surveys or called all selected pilots, and followed-up by telephone and fax as 
necessary.  In most cases, we expected interviewers to complete surveys over the telephone.  In cases 
where telephone contact was unsuccessful or where the pilots preferred face to face contact, interviewers 
arranged to complete the interview in person. 
Our methodology incorporated the standard strategies used to obtain high survey response rates.  
We trained interviewers thoroughly so that they understood the goals of the research, the questionnaire, 
and the protocols for administering the questionnaire.  We followed up by telephone (wherever possible) 
if we did not receive a response to an initial contact by mail.  If necessary, we followed up with face-to-
face contact where both telephone and mail contacts were unsuccessful.  We did not assign the “unable to 
contact” disposition to a telephone number until we had made repeated calls on different days of the week 
and at different times of day.  Likewise, we attempted face-to-face contacts on different days of the week 
and at different times of day.  If potential respondents refused the survey, interviewers experienced at 
turning refusals around called them and attempted to change their minds.  This rigorous telephone 
interview approach minimizes non-response bias at the outset by generating a non-biased sample, and 
then by ensuring a high response rate.   
In addition, we followed up with face-to-face interviews in April, 2002 in order to add several of 
the operators that we missed in the initial NIOSH survey, and to ask Capstone attitude questions.  We 
interviewed ten operators, three of whom had not been interviewed in the earlier NIOSH survey 
administration, 
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Interviewer Training 
ISER hired and trained interviewers for telephone and face-to-face, interviews with respondents.  
The initial training was 16 hours and used the following outline: 
Day 1 
Research ethics - statement of professional ethics 
Confidentiality 
History of ISER 
Purpose of survey 
Background 
Purposes and structure of Alaska Aviation Safety Survey 
Selecting the respondent 




 Special interview circumstances 
 Handling reluctant respondents 
Some techniques to prevent or turn around a refusal: 
Misinterpreted questions 
Vague answers and answers that don't fit 
Clarifying respondent's role using positive feedback 





 Disposition of interviews, record keeping 
 Paired interviewer practice 
 Readiness check —1 
 Practice interviews 
 Readiness check —2 
Initial sample assignment 
 
Interviewers are evaluated and approved by the field supervisor for readiness prior to their 
starting telephone interviews 
Confidentiality 
All respondents received voluntary participation and confidentiality information in a consent 
form.  Participants who responded by mail or face-to-face were given a copy of the form to keep, and also 
signed a copy that was attached to the interview.  If respondents returned a mail for fax survey without a 
signed consent form, we considered them to have given their implied consent.  For telephone respondents, 
interviewers read the consent form and obtained the respondent’s verbal consent.  The form included the 
following items: 
1. The authority and purpose for data collection,  
2. an explanation that participation was voluntary,  
3. An explanation of the confidentiality of their responses, including assurances that  
•  responses would not be used in any enforcement actions ,  
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•  although survey results would be available to the air carrier operator and pilot associations, 
federal agencies, and other interested parties, this would be in summary format only -- without 
any personal or corporate identifiers. 
•  the information provided is kept confidential.  Responses are locked in a file cabinet with access 
limited to research staff on the project 
Events Surrounding the NIOSH Survey 
Respondents were expected to naturally refer to their own experience and prior flying experience 
in thinking about their responses.  Three events occurred during the course of this survey, which are 
certain to have affected pilot’s responses.  On September 11 there were the tragic events at the World 
Trade Center and the shut-down of aviation nationwide.  In response to the uncertainty in the aviation 
industry and concern among respondents we stopped interviewing for one week.  On October 11, there 
was the worst commercial crash in Alaska since 1987 involving one of the largest regional operators in 
Alaska.  On October 19, there was a helicopter crash in Anchorage involving another of the largest 
regional carriers.  How and to what extent these events may have influenced pilots’ responses is 
unknown, but a series of events of this magnitude are likely to have affected public attitudes, perceptions, 
and business practices. 
Survey Dispositions and Response Rates 
Table F-2 shows the response rates for Capstone operators and pilots.  Every operator and pilot 
selected for the NIOSH sample was ultimately assigned a disposition code: 
•  Refusals 
•  Respondent Unavailable During the Study 
•  Completed Interview 
The response rate is calculated as: 
Total # of completed interviews  
Number in the original sample  
For purposes of calculating the response rates, we did not include the 61 Capstone pilot modules 
obtained by Dr Daniels in Bethel and at Capstone training classes. 
Table F-2.  Response Rates for Southeast Operators and Pilots 




Southeast Operators* 30 23 76% 
Pilots Employed by Southeast Operators* 37 30 81% 
*The true operator response rate is slightly lower; we did not draw an extended sample for our face-to-face interviews in April 
2002, but simply added three new operators to the database.  
Data Set 
A data editor reviewed the completed survey forms for completeness and consistency; whenever 
possible, our interviewers called back respondents to resolve any problems we found.  We reconfirmed 
our data entry programs to reject some types of incorrect data.  We entered a sample of the surveys twice 
and compared the two entries to measure the accuracy of data entry.  Once all the survey data was 
entered, we reviewed it and corrected for missing or unreasonable values. 
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Weighting  
We initially calculated normalized weights for operators, using statewide data.  We calculated an 
initial weight by dividing the number of operators in each stratum (large operators, small Southcentral, 
small North/Interior; small Southeast) by the number of respondents in that stratum.  To normalize the 
weights, we multiplied each initial weight by a fraction computed as the sample size (153) divided by the 
sum of all the 153 operator weights. 
We calculated two sets of weights for the pilot surveys.  The first–pilotwt and normalized 
pilotwt–weighted sample pilots to represent all pilots flying for the operators whose pilots we 
interviewed. The second set–totalwt and normalized totalwt–adjusts the first set of weights to represent all 
pilots in our universe: pilots employed by air taxi and commuter air operators and public agencies flying 
in Alaska. 
To weight to the operators represented in the survey, we calculated a separate weight for each 
company 
 Pilotwt =  Total pilots employed by company  
   Total Pilot Interviews completed from company 
 
This formula reflects the fact that the pilot’s probability of selection was different for each 
company size.  We then normalized this weight in the same way as described for the operator weights, so 
that the weighted total pilots equaled the number of pilot respondents (38): 
To adjust the sample to represent all pilots in our universe, we needed to account for the operator’s 
probability of selection, as well.  We multiplied the (non-normalized) pilot weight by the (non-
normalized) company weight, and again normalized those weights to represent the total number or pilot 
respondents. 
 
Totalwt = Pilotwt * Company Weight 
 
Use of normalized weights is appropriate to accurately calculate statistical significance and 
confidence intervals from the survey data.  Since the pilot sample was stratified by company there is a 
unique weight for each of the 133 air operators represented in the sample.  Consequently, the weights 
themselves are confidential. 
We present the weighted operator and pilot survey responses.  However, because the operators 
responding to the Capstone-specific questions were both purposive (operators that had expressed an 
interest in participating in the program) and non-random (other operators in the same communities, 
available when our interviewer was there) we present the answers to those Capstone questions 
unweighted. 
The following pages show the instruments with frequencies (and ranges and means, as 
appropriate). 
Capstone Phase II Baseline Report  Appendices 
  C-9 




(CAPSTONE SE BASELINE,  
NIOSH INTERVIEWS FALL 2001; 
 ADDED INTERVIEWS, MARCH 2003) 
 
 
As part of expanding its Capstone Program into Southeast Alaska, the FAA had contracted with the 
University of Alaska to conduct a study of aviation safety in Southeast prior to the Capstone 
implementation.  As part of that study, we are using surveys conducted for the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health in their 2001-2002 study to improve aviation safety throughout Alaska.  
This questionnaire was designed for that study; we are asking operators who were not selected in the 
NIOSH sample to complete the questionnaire. 
 
In addition, we are asking all operators to complete an excerpt from the Capstone Module of that survey, 
designed to study the first Capstone implementation, in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta area. 
 
 
We want to know your thoughts and perceptions about aviation in Alaska as well as about your actual 
aviation practices. It will take about xx minutes to complete the questions. 
 
Your answers will be kept confidential and will be used only in combination with those of others so that 












    
    
    
    
    
 
Study No. 
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        START TIME:  __________ 
        INTERVIEWER ID:  _______ 
 
I would like to begin by asking you a few questions about the operation of your air carrier business. 
 
OP1. First, how many pilots do you, including yourself, currently employ?  5.17 (average includes 
operators asked at different seasons) 
 
OP2. How many pilots, including yourself, do you typically employ each season, during the summer? 
the autumn? the winter? and the spring? 
 
7.96 Summer 3.24 Winter 
    4.09 Autumn 4.43 Spring 
 
(range is 0 to 27 pilots) 
 
OP3. How many pilots did your company hire in the year 2001? how many in 2000? in 1999? 
 
3.55 2001 (total expected) 
  3.75 2000 




OP4. Including all locations and aircraft, can you tell me the total number of scheduled flight hours and 
departures flown by your company in the year 2000? And how many total unscheduled flight hours 
and departures did your company make? 
 
Scheduled flight hours Avg: 1,006 Sum: 21,120 
Unscheduled flight hours Avg: 2,248 Sum: 47,209 
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The next questions ask about your hiring and scheduling practices. 
 
OP6. When hiring a pilot, which type of experience is most important to you? (READ THE 
FOLLOWING LIST AND RANK 1=MOST IMPORTANT, 2=SECOND, AND SO FORTH) 
 
Number of responses that  Most 
Imp. 




Flying in the area of Alaska where your company 
operates 
12 4 2 0 1 
Flying anywhere in Alaska 1 2 9 6 1 
Total flying hours, anywhere 0 3 4 11 1 
Flying in the type of aircraft your company uses 5 9 3 1 1 
 
OP7. Is there some other pilot experience or qualification that is more important than any of the four I 
just mentioned? 
 







OP8. How much of a problem is pilot fatigue in pilot scheduling? Is it a major problem, a minor 
problem, or not a problem? 
 
0 A major problem 
12 A minor problem 
11 Not a problem 
 
OP9. How do you pay your pilots? (USE CHOICES AS PROBE IF NECESSARY) 
 
0 Hourly for all duty hours 
0 Hourly for flight hours only 
10 Salary 
5 Combination of salary and flight hours 
0 Combination of flight hours, duty hours, and salary 







OP7a. Will you please describe it? Pilot safety history; recommendations; 
flight evaluation; ability to handle stress and make good decisions; maturity; 
attitude; personality; formal training 
OP9a.  Please explain   Salary plus bonus;  self-employed 
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OP10. Do you pay your pilots overtime? 
 






Now I would like to ask you some questions about Federal Aviation Regulations. 
 
OP11. From your personal experience, are the FARs interpreted consistently by different inspectors at 
different times? 
 







OP12. Do you feel that some FARs interfere with getting the job done, without contributing to safety? 
 









Now I'd like to ask you about some of your company's policies and procedures. 
 
OP13. Does your company require higher-than-FAA weather minimums for flying? 
 












OP14. Does your company have one or more written programs for pilot training to help pilots deal 
with whiteout conditions (with low visibility conditions, flat lighting conditions, recovery 
from inadvertent flight into IMC?) 
 
OP10a. Under what conditions? 
No responses 
OP11a. Interpretation of flight and duty time; interpretation of 
manuals; maintenance discrepancies; this was more of a problem 
in the past 
OP12a. Which regulations are they and why do you feel that 
way?   
Hazmat regulations too complex for small carriers; SVFR traffic in 
Ketchikan; arbitrary AD’s; safer to fly in 300’/20 miles than in 
500’/2 miles; items installed for a particular use can’t be removed 
without removing all associated components(e.g., air conditioning; 
load manifests for each type of helicopter 
OP13a. When did your company began this requirement? 
Range: 1994 – 2000; “newer pilots 
 
OP13b. Please describe your policy or send/fax a copy (786-7739) 
 
Higher for flight-seeing; pilots have personal minimums; dispatch 
similar to part 121 operation 
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 Yes No If yes, when started 
a. Whiteout conditions 9 13 From 1989 to 2001 
b. Low visibility conditions 10 12 From 1989 to 2001 
c. Flat lighting conditions 7 15 From 1989 to 2001 
d. Recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC 11 12 From 1989 to 2001 
 
Now I'm going to ask about pilot checking procedures for the same four conditions: 
 
OP15. Does your company have one or more written programs for pilot checking to ensure pilot 
proficiency in whiteout conditions (in low visibility conditions, flat lighting conditions, 
recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC?) 
 
 Yes No If yes, when started 
a. Whiteout conditions 12 10 From 1989 to 2001 
b. Low visibility conditions 13 9 From 1989 to 1999 
c. Flat lighting conditions 10 12 From 1989 to 1999 
d. Recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC 16 7 From 1989 to 1999 
 
OP16.  Who, inside or outside the company, has the authority to cancel a flight? (MARK ALL THAT 
APPLY) 
 
23 Pilot   
 
18 Someone else in the company  (WHAT IS THEIR POSITION? 
   AND ARE THEY A PILOT?)  
Chief Pilot; Director of Operations; Owner; Dispatcher; Base Manager; President; VP; Tour Operations 
manager 
 
❍  Someone else outside the company  (WHAT IS THEIR POSITION? 







OP17. What initial and recurrent training does the company provide or require that person to have?  
 
 
No responses.   
 
If pilot only, skip to Q.OP18 
INTERVIEWER CHECKPOINT:  IF A NON-PILOT EMPLOYEE MAKES DECISIONS 
ABOUT LAUNCHING FLIGHTS ASK TO OP17.  IF A PILOT EMPLOYEE (PILOT OR 
CHIEF PILOT, ETC.) SKIP TO OP18 
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OP18. Does your company have a written list of required conditions to launch a flight, for example, a 
risk assessment worksheet? 
 







OP19. How many of your aircraft have auto pilots? Do you consider the auto pilot to be very helpful, 
somewhat helpful, or not at all helpful to flight safety in Alaska (NOT JUST TO YOUR 
COMPANY)? (CONTINUE WITH THE LIST OF REMAINING EQUIPMENT USING SAME 
QUESTION FORMAT) 
 
 Sum of a/c # of companies  































a. Auto pilot 7 1 1 4 
b. VOR 45 2 4 8 
c. GPS – VFR 77 12 7 1 
d. GPS – IFR 22 3 1 2 
e. Loran 5 0 1 6 
f. Mid-air collision avoidance system 3 3 1 0 
g. Other Avionics: ADF, NavComs, Capstone, 
Radar Altimeter 14 4 2 0 
h. Pilot shoulder harness  127 20 2 0 
i. Rear Passenger shoulder harness 39 5 4 1 
j. Pilot 5-point restraint harness 18 2 2 1 
k. Other crash protection equipment PFDs, 
survival equipment 
3 2 0 0 
 
OP20. Now thinking about your company's financial success, how important is on-time delivery of 
mail? Is it very important, somewhat important, or not important? What about on-time delivery 
of passengers? How important is on-time delivery of cargo? 
 







a. On-time delivery of mail 6 4 1 10 
b. On-time delivery of passengers 7 9 0 6 
c. On-time delivery of cargo 7 7 2 6 
OP21. In the last 18 months, has there been a change in your company’s insurance costs per seat? 
 
16 Yes 4 No change  
 
Skip to Question OP 22 
OP18a. When did your company begin to use this list? 
 1 response: draft in spring 2002 
 
OP18b. Please send/fax a copy of this list (786-7739). 
Not provided 
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OP21a. Did the costs increase or decrease? 
 
13 Increase:  from 2 to 300%; mean 91% 





OP21b. Why do you believe they changed? 
 
Industry increase; accidents; Alaska market; 9/11; women take fewer risks 
 
 
OP22. What survival equipment, beyond legally required items, is in your company aircraft? 
 
 




OP23. What training does your company provide to use the survival equipment in the aircraft? 
 
 
Annual emergency training; familiarization; joint exercise with Coast Guard and Civil Air patrol; complete, 





OP21aa. By what percent did they increase or decrease? 
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OP24. Now, we are interested in your opinion about measures that might improve aviation safety 
throughout Alaska, not just in your company. 
 
Can you tell me how effective each of the following measures could be in preventing aircraft 
crashes if it were widely applied in Alaska aviation? 
 































Would pilot training improvements in meteorology be very effective, somewhat effective, or 
not effective in preventing aircraft crashes?  (CONTINUE THE LIST OF REMAINING 
MEASURES USING SAME QUESTION FORMAT.) 
Pilot training improvements in the following areas: 
a. Pilot training improvements in meteorology 10 8 4 
b. Pilot training improvements in decision-making 17 4 1 
c. Pilot training improvements in white-out/flat-light conditions 11 9 2 
d. Pilot training improvements in regional hazards 12 9 1 
 
Now think about company policy and procedures…. 
Would company policies that included written criteria for go/no go decisions be very effective, 
somewhat effective, or not effective in preventing aircraft crashes?  (CONTINUE THE LIST OF 
REMAINING MEASURES USING SAME QUESTION FORMAT.) 
Company policies and procedures 
e. Written criteria for go/no-go decisions 5 12 5 
f. Rewards from management for flights or flight hours without 
accidents/incidents 
8 8 6 
g. Pay based on salary rather than flight hours or flights 12 6 4 
h. More flight time required of new pilots 9 6 7 
i. Better checks of a pilot’s flying history before hiring 9 7 6 
 
Now think about the weather…. 
Would more locations with manned weather reporting be very effective, somewhat effective, or 
not effective in preventing aircraft crashes?  (CONTINUE THE LIST OF REMAINING 
MEASURES USING SAME QUESTION FORMAT.) 
Weather 
j. More locations with manned weather reporting 15 7 1 
k. More locations with automated weather reporting 13 7 2 
l. Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 14 9 0 
m. Increased and improved use of video cameras, such as mountain 
pass cameras 
20 1 1 
n. Improved passenger understanding of weather hazards 7 7 8 
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Now think about the operating environments for companies like yours…. 
Would changes in how by-pass mail is given to operators be very effective, somewhat effective, 
or not effective in preventing aircraft crashes?  (CONTINUE THE LIST OF REMAINING 
MEASURES USING SAME QUESTION FORMAT.) 
Operating Environment 
o. Changes in how by-pass mail is given to operators  2 6 2 
p. More time to deliver by-pass mail before it’s switched to another 
operator 
3 6 1 
q. Financial incentives (e.g., lower insurance rates, preference in 
mail contracts) for flights or flight hours without 
accidents/incidents 
6 2 4 
 
OP25. Thinking of the seventeen (17) measures you just rated, if you had to choose only two as most 
useful, which would they be?  (REPEAT MEASURES IF NECESSARY AND RECORD THE 
APPROPRIATE LETTER IN THE BOX.) 
 
 
Safety Measure from OP 24 # of 
Respondents 
b. Pilot training improvements in decision-making 13 
m. Increased and improved use of video cameras, such as mountain pass 
cameras 10 
j. More locations with manned weather reporting 6 
h. More flight time required of new pilots 4 
g. Pay based on salary rather than flight hours or flights 3 
d. Pilot training improvements in regional hazards 2 
q. Financial incentives (e.g., lower insurance rates, preference in mail 
contracts) for flights or flight hours without accidents/incidents 2 
i. Better checks of a pilot’s flying history before hiring 2 
l. Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 2 





OP26. Are there any other measures that we didn't mention that might improve aviation safety in 
Alaska? 
 
16 Yes   4 No 
 
 What are they? 
 
 
Better avionics (EGPWS and Capstone); Medallion Program participation; For pilots, more experience, 
better flight training; knowledge (especially local area), and knowledge of maintenance; AWOS weather 
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P 27. What other about aviation safety in Alaska do you think we should know about? 
 
Considering the variety of activities, the elements, number of operations, and the seasonal nature of the flight 
peaks suggests that Alaska aviation accidents are surprisingly low. The situational awareness of a moving map 
display would be the most useful tool in the airplane to reduce accidents. 
Changes in attitude and education (e.g. risk management) should improve aviation safety, given several years. 
Accidents usually happen here in August/Sept largely due to short season with long hours. Fatigue and 14-hr duty 
day over a season of 7-day weeks take its toll. 
Good consistent maintenance 
There is a need for thorough flight checkout of pilot applicants--more important than flight hours or history. 
More IFR flight, twin-engine operation could improve flight safety if these were economically feasible. 
(a) Too few career Alaska pilots; (b) VFR flying in Alaska requires more knowledge than IFR flying; (c) 
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Air Carrier Survey: Capstone questions 
Capstone Phase II Baseline Study 
Southeast Alaska 
 
The Alaskan Region’s "Capstone Program" is an accelerated effort to improve aviation safety 
and efficiency through installation of government-furnished Global Positioning System (GPS)-
based avionics and data link communications suites in commercial aircraft.  Capstone was 
originally implemented in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta area of Alaska; the Phase II 
implementation area is Southeast Alaska. 
 
The following questions are about how you expect the Capstone program to affect your 
operations in Southeast Alaska.  You may not know the answers to some questions – that’s fine.  
We are interested in finding out what Southeast Alaska air carriers know about the program, and 
what they expect it to do, as of March 2003, before it’s been fully implemented.  
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CO8. Listed below are some potential benefits from using Capstone equipment in 















a. Fewer cancelled flights due to new 
instrument approaches at remote airports 
7 0 1 1 3 0 
b. Safer operations at remote airports due to 
new instrument approaches 
7 0 1 2 2 0 
c. Safer flying in minimum legal VFR 
conditions 
0 0 2 3 6 1 
d. Fewer near mid-air collisions 0 0 4 2 6 0 
e. More useful weather information 0 1 5 4 2 0 
f. Better knowledge of other aircraft and 
ground vehicle locations when taxiing 
5 3 1 2 1 0 
g. Improved SVFR procedures due to better 
pilot and controller knowledge of aircraft 
locations 
0 0 1 6 4 1 
h. Easier in-flight diversions or re-routes 0 2 2 4 3 3 
i. Time savings from more direct flight routes 2 2 1 2 5 0 
j. Improved terrain awareness for pilots 0 0 0 2 10 0 
k. Improved search and rescue capabilities 0 0 3 3 6 0 
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CO9. Are there other benefits the Capstone program will provide? 
 
Situational awareness; support in emergency such as inadvertent IMC; improved operations in 
marginal VFR; oversight by company dispatch; newer pilots will be lost less; reduced insurance 
rates; improved safety confidence; increased pilot comfort; more accurate and timely decisions; 
lower Minimum Enroute Altitudes (e.g. for medivac patients who need lower altitude; to avoid 
icing); improved passenger confidence. 
 
 






Improved terrain awareness for pilots 9 
Fewer near mid-air collisions 5 
Improved search and rescue capabilities 4 
Time savings from direct flights 3 
Fewer cancelled flights/instrument 
approaches 2 
Improved SVFR procedures 2 
Easier in-flight diversions or re-routes 1 
Emergency support 1 
More useful weather info 1 





CO10. Listed below are some potential problems with using Capstone equipment.  How serious do you 
















a. Less heads-up time 0 4 3 2 2 1 
b. Heavier workload in the cockpit 2 3 5 1 0 1 
c. More aircraft flying in the same 
airspace because they are using 
GPS point-to-point routing  
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CO11. Are there other potential problems for you that Capstone may cause or add to?  
 
Using equipment to push the weather; attempting to use it to fly into IFR; lack of redundancy if 
used for IFR; pilots may not talk to each other; attitude differences between older, experienced and 
younger, less experienced pilots; 75 percent of time flying over salt water;  if used to fly very low 
would be dangerous; overconfidence; danger of over reliance on Capstone; maintenance difficulties 
in salt water environment; less experienced pilots using equipment to fly in unfamiliar terrain; 
minimum equipment lists (grounded if Capstone is not working); training costs for proficiency; 





CO15. Which of the issues below do you think might cause pilots to choose not to use Capstone 
equipment? 
 
 Yes No Don’t Know/ No Opinion 
a. Too distracting 4 8  
b. Too difficult to use 4 8  
c. Don’t want company watching aircraft 
location at all times 
7 4  
d. Don’t trust equipment to provide reliable 
information 
2 10  
e. Concerned that equipment might break 1 11  
 




False traffic proximity warnings; need for or lack of training; concerns that aircraft might be 
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Problem # of 
Responses 
Too distracting/Less heads-up time 5 
Too difficult to use 1 
Learning required to upgrade to IFR capability 1 
Using equipment in lieu of training/over reliance on equip 2 
Maintenance problems 1 
Grounding a/c due to equipment problems 3 
Don’t want company/FAA watching 4 
Overconfidence in marginal weather 2 
Using equipment for bootleg IFR  1 
Don’t trust equipment 2 




CO14. How much do you expect Capstone equipment will help you to make go/no go flight decisions 
under the following conditions? 
 
 







a. Low ceilings 6 1 4 1 
b. Low visibility 7 1 4 0 
c. High winds 12 0 0 0 
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•  Capstone can help new pilots in their learning of the areas and its unique characteristics, 
which is now a concern. 
•  Traffic avoidance with transient aircraft that are not Capstone equipped 
•  It’s not a level playing field with regard to federal excise taxes. 
•  Concerns about Special VFR regulations, especially in Ketchikan. 
•  The benefit will come if everyone has Capstone, not just a few. 
•  Remember we’re still a VFR environment; pilots could get lazy and spend too much time 
inside. 
•  Company and pilot attitudes towards safety is a concern, as is the weather. 
•  Capstone program appears to be designed for IFR operations; most operators in SE Alaska 
are not IFR certified. 
•  In heavily trafficked areas, the aircraft avoidance feature could be too distracting, in addition 
to the problem of not all aircraft being equipped. 
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Study No  
 
NIOSH PILOT INTERVIEW, FALL/WINTER 2001/02 
SOUTHEAST PILOT RESPONSES1 
 
I would like to begin by asking you a few questions about your flying career and your background. 
 
A1. Which pilot ratings and certificates do you hold? 
 
36 Commercial 31 Single-engine land 
27 Instrument 18 Multi-engine land 
17 ATP 24 Single-engine sea 
10 Helicopter 10 Multi-engine sea 
13 Flight instructor 3 Others (please specify) 
    




A2. How many total hours have you flown in Alaska? how many in the last 12 months? Now can you 
tell us how many Alaska departures have you made in your total flight career?  In he last 12 
months?  Finally, can you tell us how many total hours you have flown in all locations, including 
Alaska? how many in the last 12 months?  
 
   Mean Hours reported: 
Flight Hours Alaska All Locations, incl. Alaska 
Total Flight Career 5304 7212 
Last 12 months 239 591 
 
 
The next questions ask about your total flight career. 
 
A3. How many instrument hours have you flown in Alaska?   Mean: 119 hrs 
 
A3a. Can you estimate your total number 
of instrument hours? 
 
    Mean: 305 hrs 
 
A4. How many hours have you flown for your current employer? Mean: 2376 hrs 
 
 
                                                     
1 Data are weighted and rounded to whole numbers; totals may be slightly different than 36 unweighted responses 
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A5. Thinking about the number of years you have flown in Alaska, how many have been seasonal? 
 
 
       range: 0 to 6 years 
 
A5a. How many have been year-round?    Median 2.7 yrs;  
      range, 0 to 36 years 
 
 
A6. Please estimate what percent of your paid flight hours in 2000 occurred in each season. (For 
example, 100% summer; or 25% spring, 50% summer, 25% autumn, etc.) 
15 % Spring 20 % Autumn 
    54 % Summer 11 % Winter 
 
 
A7. Over your entire career, how many different companies have you worked for as a pilot? 
 
 
    range: 1 to 12 
 
A7a. Over how many years has that been?  range: 1 to 39 
 
 
A8. What is your gender?  A9a. How old are you? 
  
2 Female  39 yrs; range 20 to 66 
34 Male 
 
A9. What is your race? (multiple responses allowed) 
 
1 American Indian or Alaska Native   
36 White   
1 Latino    
 
A10. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed? (PLEASE MARK ONLY 
ONE) 
 
0 Attended high school; didn’t graduate 2 Associate’s degree 
1 GED 12 Bachelor’s degree 
11 High school diploma 1 Master’s degree 
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A11. Now, based on your experience as a pilot, do you feel that some Federal Aviation Regulations 
interfere with getting the job done, without contributing to safety? 
 
17 No 18 Yes 
 
A11a. Can you give me one or more examples? 
 
135 - 100, no talking unless strait/level flight below 10,000 ft.  Regs on flight + duty time are confusing so it doesn't help toward safety 
Allowing a 14-hr duty day instead of something less, like 10-12- hr duty days. Far Part 135. 
The duty time and time off max duty day of 14 hours with only 13 days off required in 90 days 
Power struggle between pilots and FAA especially if pilots are more experienced.  Anchorage FAA inspectors came to Juneau demanded 
main struts be pumped down 3 1/2 " from 7 ", it created tail dragging and prop damage 
FAA does just what it wants to do and interprets all the regs the way they see fit, even if basic safety is at stake. 
Flight duty time under 135 is in direct conflict with the ability to perform, some pilots can work 10hours straight and others can't handle 6 
hours, part 67 covers physical condition and mental ability,  leave it to part 67 
Southeast AK seaplane operators used to be able to fly at lower altitudes with greater visibility, that has been eliminated, law requires you to 
be at 500 feet now, it was safer flying at lower altitudes 
Weather minimums to a point, the letter of the law does interfere with safe flight operations, but I know there's got to be stipulations 
Carrying weapons is a hot topic.  Sept 11th would have been less of a tragedy if FAA had allowed cockpit crews to be armed 
Processes involved in certifying particular maintenance procedures, we're trying to get approval for ski basket for the helicopter.  We're being 
denied using it without scientific proof that we're not going to crash the aircraft, which costs millions of dollars 
Seat removal legs, cloud clearance requirements 
Seat removal and replacement re: small single engine aircraft 
 
A12. Are there routes, locations, or conditions that should require higher than FAA minimum weather 
conditions for flying? 
 
22 No 8 Yes 
 
A12a. What are they? 
 
A13. During the peak season, what hours do you typically work each day, including periods of time 
you are not on duty? 
 
Mean hours worked: 12; range from 8 to 14 per day 
 
 










Calculated hours per week:  mean 66 hours; range 30 to 98 hours per week 
Duty hours per day:  mean 12 hrs 
Days per week: mean 5.4 Range; 5 to 7 
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A16. During the peak season, how often would you have liked to decline a flight due to fatigue, but 
you flew anyway?  (MARK ONLY ONE) 
 
0 Daily 10 Less often than monthly 
3 Weekly 19 Never 
1 Monthly 
 
A17. How often do you have to decide whether to fly into unknown weather conditions that may 
deteriorate below VFR minimums?  (MARK ONLY ONE) 
 
7 Daily 5 Less often than monthly 
12 Weekly 1 Never 
8 Monthly 
 
A18. How often do you fly into weather that is different from what was predicted when you started 
your flight?  (MARK ONLY ONE) 
 
5 Daily 8 Less often than monthly 
17 Weekly 0 Never 
6 Monthly 
 
A19. How often do Flight Service Stations provide accurate, current weather conditions for where you 
fly?  (MARK ONLYONE) 
 
1 Always 0 Rarely 
33 Most of the time 0 Never 
2 Occasionally 
 
A20. While working for your current employer, have you declined a flight due to poor visibility or 
other weather-related reasons? 
 
 
0 No      30 Yes 
 
A21. Did the company support your decision? 
 
0 No 27 Yes 3  Missing 
 
 
Skip to Question A 22 
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A22. Do you have standard procedures to follow if you unexpectedly fly into IMC? 
 
7 No 29 Yes 
 
range of comments: 
Execute a 180 degree turn and/or descend and maintain visual contact with land 
Personal procedures, company procedures are not standard 
Contact base 
Return to VMC immediately 
If bad weather fly close to shore so if we hit bad weather we can turn to land, do a 180 and drop down as low as we need 
change altitude 
Get out of it; change altitude; radio base. 
We are taught slow the aircraft, 180 degree turn, transfer to instrument flight, return to VFR conditions.  Training involves 
recognition and avoidance.  I don't believe in inadvertent, you make a decision 
 




































a. White-out conditions 10 8 2 12 
b. Low visibility conditions? 13 12 2 4 
c. Flat light conditions? 11 7 2 13 
d. Recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC? 15 9 3 6 
 
A24. How confident are you that you can safely fly under VFR rules in low visibility conditions? Are 





























a. Low visibility 33 3 0 
b. Flat-light conditions 17 12 7 
c. White-out conditions 16 8 12 
 
A25. What survival training have you received from your current employer? 
 
 
None; initial ground school; basic survival training; annual training; dunk tank to learn escape methods 
(FAA sponsored); over water emergencies; care of passengers; communication with rescuers; fire 
extinguishing; water survival.  
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A26. From the list of resources I am going to read, which ones do you use when making the decision to 
launch a flight?  (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) 
 
34 Flight Service Station 24 National Weather Service 
32 Station Manager or other company personnel at destination(s) 30 
Dispatcher, flight follower, other 
company personnel at hub or 
headquarters 
33 AWOS/ ASOS 33 Pilots who are in route or who have flown the route that day 
9 
Other (please specify) 
Community people that you know; 
internet; marine wx; video cameras 
  
 
A27. If you refuse to launch a flight due to marginal weather, how likely is it that your 











































a. Your passengers will fly with a different 
company? 
18 10 7 0 2 
b. The Post Office will give bypass mail to 
another company? 
5 1 3 8 19 
c. Some other pilot will comment that they could 
have completed the flight? 
22 10 1 1 2 
 
 
A28. Compared to other jobs, how safe is your pilot job? Is it much safer than other jobs, slightly safer, 
as safe as other jobs, slightly more dangerous, or much more dangerous than other jobs? 
 
1 Much safer than other jobs 17 Slightly more dangerous than other jobs 
1 Slightly safer than other jobs 3 Much more dangerous than other jobs 
11 As safe as other jobs 
 
A29. Do you have any accidents or incidents on your record? 
 
4 No 30 Yes 
 
Capstone Phase II Baseline Report  Appendices 
  C-31 
A30. Now I'm going to read some different types of avionics, and I would like you to tell me how 
helpful you think each is in preventing crashes? How helpful is the auto pilot? Is it very helpful, 




































a. Auto pilot 9 10 11 2 
b. VOR 3 19 13 1 
c. GPS – VFR 33 2 1 0 
d. GPS – IFR 14 11 6 2 
e. Loran 1 6 22 4 
f. Mid-air collision avoidance system 16 4 9 4 
g. Other avionics ADF, Transponder, 
Capstone, radar, radar altimeter, satellite 
phone, TCAS 
17 3   
 
 
A31. I would like to ask your opinion about measures that might improve aviation safety for all pilots 
in Alaska. 
 
Can you tell me how effective pilot training improvements in meteorology could be in preventing 
aircraft crashes if widely applied in Alaska aviation? Would it be very effective, somewhat effective, 
or not effective?   
 






























Pilot training improvements in the following areas: 
a. Pilot training improvements in meteorology 19 11 5 
b. Pilot training improvements in decision-making 28 6 3 
c. Pilot training improvements in white-out/flat-light conditions 19 15 2 
d. Pilot training improvements in regional hazards 24 10 2 
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Now I'm going to ask about company policy and procedures, would company policies that included 
written criteria for go/no go decisions be very effective, somewhat effective, or not effective in 
preventing aircraft crashes?   
 






























Company policies and procedures 
e. Written criteria for go/no-go decisions 10 17 9 
f. Rewards from management for flights or flight hours without 
accidents/incidents 
12 14 9 
g. Pay based on salary rather than flight hours or flights 18 16 2 
h. More flight time required of new pilots 17 13 6 
i. Better checks of a pilot’s flying history before hiring 8 21 8 
 
Now thinking about the weather, would more locations with manned weather reporting be very 
effective, somewhat effective, or not effective in preventing aircraft crashes?   
 
Weather 
j. More locations with manned weather reporting 25 9 2 
k. More locations with automated weather reporting 20 13 4 
l. Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 21 14 1 
m. Increased and improved use of video cameras, such as mountain 
pass cameras 
24 8 4 
n. Improved passenger understanding of weather hazards 6 14 17 
 
I'll move on now to operating environments for companies like yours. Would changes in how by-
pass mail is given to operators be very effective, somewhat effective, or not effective in preventing 
aircraft crashes?   
 
Operating Environment 
o. Changes in how by-pass mail is given to operators  2 6 22 
p. More time to deliver by-pass mail before it’s switched to another 
operator 
3 7 18 
q. Financial incentives (e.g., lower insurance rates, preference in 
mail contracts) for flights or flight hours without 
accidents/incidents 
10 17 8 
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A32. Thinking of those 17 measures you just rated, if you had to choose only two as most useful, 
which would they be?   
 
Measures listed Number 
of ‘votes’ 
b. Pilot training improvements in decision-making 19 
j. More locations with manned weather reporting 12 
q. Financial incentives (e.g., lower insurance rates, preference in mail contracts) for flights or 
flight hours without accidents/incidents 8 
a. Pilot training improvements in meteorology 5 
g. Pay based on salary rather than flight hours or flights 5 
h. More flight time required of new pilots 5 
m. Increased and improved use of video cameras, such as mountain pass cameras 4 
d. Pilot training improvements in regional hazards 3 
l. Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 3 
c. Pilot training improvements in white-out/flat-light conditions 2 
k. More locations with automated weather reporting 2 
f. Rewards from management for flights or flight hours  1 
p. More time to deliver by-pass mail before it’s switched to another operator 1 
 
A33. If there are other measures that you believe might improve aviation safety in Alaska, but which 
we didn't discuss in the previous question, can you tell me what they are? 
 
Better equipment for IFR operations, i.e. radar services, better assistance to evaluate and tailor IFR approaches for 135/121 operations.  In 
Southeast AK, support floatplane operations, approved VFR corridors to fly lower than 500 feet with 2 miles vis 
Change the State aviations culture to one of quality air service with zero compromises instead of getting the job done.  Ensure that FAA 
supports these operators and punishes the cowboys 
AWOS/ASOS would be a great addition to your ability to disseminate weather very fast updates once/minute 
Recurrent pilot training every six months instead of twelve for FAR 135 operators 
More AWOS stations in villages; Putting automated wx observation units in certain areas and/or passes I think might enhance safety 
We need more manned weather stations. 90% of accidents are weather-related. 
High cost of insurance and mandatory FAA regulations cause 135's to push weather to make enough to pay for all this.  I think high operations 
cost is the reason we have so many accidents in AK. 
If Capstone is proving to be so great, why isn't it being considered for all of Alaska? 
There are too many private pilots flying that don't know what they are doing. 
More on-site human observers.  AWOS/ASOS are inadequate.  NWS computer modeling depends on accurate and plentiful observations.  
AWOS/ASOS are not dependable or accurate.  We used to have plentiful observation stations in the 1960s and 70s, what happened? 
More local flight service, the present system is far from what we use to have.  Less of this automated junk and some personnel in the field 
doing the job 
Need to lower altitude and increase visibility, safer system for our jobs 
We would like to see Capstone expanded to our area, Yakutat. 
Capstone project or some of the aspects of the Capstone project, terrain avoidance and aircraft traffic avoidance would benefit us 
Periodic training through the year for new pilots to interact also with seasoned pilots. 
FAA is too nosey and not consistent in dealing with aviation problems. They watch us so closely for the least thing and don't realize we are 
human beings just like them. 
Need more AWOS stations in the smaller communities. 
Most companies are great, but some companies put pressure on pilots to perform and that can lead to accidents. Also, reduce amount of 
paperwork that is required; that will take stress off a pilot. Also, how about an occasional "slap on the back" for good  
We need to install more AWOS throughout Alaska. 
We need more seasoned pilots who know how to fly and use common sense. Where are our older pilots? 
More consistency in the FAA.  Every inspector they have seems to have a different interpretation of the regulations.  They need to focus on 
safety more and paperwork less 
Smaller communities need to get traffic advisories directly rather than going through other larger communities flight services.   
Pilots need to fly within their equipment and experience capabilities. 
More manned weather stations would be helpful. 
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A34. Do you have any other comments you would like to add about aviation safety in Alaska? 
 
Challenging task 
Over the 24 years I've been doing this, been a lot of changes all good toward safety.  I'm very encouraged to the 
extent that safety's taken in this state mostly d/t operators.  Also FAA + pilots; nature of our business is turnover,  
Don't really have any, there will always be pilots out there who will make bad decisions, it's hard to make rules and 
regulations that will stop them from making bad decisions 
Aircraft accidents can never be totally eliminated.  Both pilot decision making and aircraft will continue to 
breakdown.  Fast moving weather will also catch pilots off-guard.  But, through pilot training and improved 
weather information distribution, both 
Less duty time for pilots. 
Weather reporting has gone down since Flight Service Stations have been shut down. 
A group came into Juneau to study aviation safety last year and found those carriers with the best safety records 
were the carriers who did annual (hands on) training with their pilots every year. 
Sometimes people tend to fly at night VFR, with single engine. I'd like to see that eliminated. 
The FAA isn't as strict with NEW pilot licensing as they should be. They don't do as thorough check rides as they 
should before issuing a pilot's license. 
The more experience a pilot has in type of aircraft he flies and the more air time in location where he flies, the less 
likely he is to have an accident. 
1. Why is it that in the continental U.S., lodges and guides are not allowed to haul clients for pay and yet in AK 
they are?  Lodge and guide operations constitute a large portion of the aviation activity in AK, but are basically 
unregulated, why?   
We work in a very tough environment, train us and tell us to do the best we can, don't implement more rules, they 
just confuse the issues at hand 
The duty time requirement is too high, would prefer twelve hrs to current fourteen hrs per day.  The company puts 
pressure on pilots to fly for recognizable financial reasons.  This requires the pilot to remain level needed in 
decision making regarding pa 
One of the most dangerous things I felt when I was fairly new at this game, if weather was questionable, they 
waited 10 minutes then sent an experienced guy out, this put pressure on new guys and is a big factor in safety 
I think it's inherently pretty safe right now.  Of course there are risks.  I don't think more regulations will help other 
than inhibiting operations 
State needs to consider some kind of subsidy for insurance for owner/operators.  Getting out of hand.  Makes for 
less flights for residents, insurance rates are prohibitive and I understand its o/t accidents.   
IFR traffic can tie up approach zone to Yakutat, and we have to circle sometime for 20 min. 
It's gotten a bad rap, small operators have been hit pretty hard by insurance companies because of bad press 
If every air carrier trained like Temsco, there would be fewer accidents. They are very caring and helpful and are 
very strict about maintenance on their aircraft. 
New pilots (inexperienced) need more time in the area they are flying in and the aircraft they are using. After a few 
trips, it's easy to get "cocky" and not pay attention. They think they've learned it all because they've flown the route 
a few times. 
We need more public awareness; esp. with this new Capstone, and funding may come in to help the "little guy." 
Some pilots that fly in bush areas sometimes get bad because there's no one really monitoring the flight. They take 
too many chances. I understand Capstone (company) can monitor these pilots. If so, we need Capstone in all areas. 
Aeronautical Decision Program that FAA recommends needs to be mandatory. It is excellent for pilots of all 
experiences. 
Weather is a big factor, and pilots shouldn't be pressured to fly if they don't feel comfortable. 
Pilots and operators in AK spend too much time dealing with the FAA on issues that don't help safety 
The RCO feeds most information to Sitka flight service rather than feeding it directly to Petersburg or any traffic 
advisories.  Petersburg needs to be able to receive traffic advisories directly.  We have to get our info directly 
 
Thank you for your time.  All of the information you have provided is confidential 
and cannot be used for enforcement purposes. 
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Appendix D.  Acronyms 
 
A & P Airframe and Powerplant (aviation mechanic certification) 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
ASOS Automated surface observing system 
ATC Air Traffic Control or Controller 
AWOS Automated weather observing system 
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
CTAF Common Traffic Advisory Frequency 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation 
FIS-B Flight Information System – Broadcast 
FSS Flight Service Station 
GBT Ground-based Transceiver 
GPS Global Positioning System 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
ISER Institute of Social and Economic Research, U Alaska Anchorage 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
METAR Meteorological Aviation Report 
MFD Multi-Function Display (of Capstone avionics) 
NDB Non Directional Beacon – a navigation aid 
NEXRAD Next Generation Radar 
NIOSH National Institutes of Occupational Safety and Health 
NMAC Near Mid Air Collision 
NOTAM Notices to Airmen 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PIREP Pilot Report 
SVFR Special Visual Flight Rules 
TAF Terminal Aerodrome Forecast 
TAWS Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
TCF Terrain Clearance Floor 
TIS-B Traffic Information System – Broadcast 
UAA-ATD University of Alaska Anchorage Aviation Technology Division 
UAT Universal Access Transceiver 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VOR Variable Omni-directional Radio – a navigation aid 
Wx Weather 
 
For detailed definitions of a wide variety of aviation terms, refer to the FAA’s Pilot/Controller Glossary, 
available at  
http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/PCG/ 
 
 
